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Originalism Isn’t What It Used to Be: The
Nondelegation Doctrine, Originalism, and
Government by Judiciary
Kurt Eggert
“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those
who administer each department the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the
others. . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”
– James Madison1
“[Originalism’s] greatest defect, in my view, is the difficulty of
applying it correctly. . . [I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb
the
original
understanding
of
an
ancient
text.”
– Justice Antonin Scalia2
“[Montesquieu’s] meaning, as his own words import, and still
more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can
amount to no more than this, that where the WHOLE power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution are subverted.” – James Madison3
“I’m an originalist; I’m a textualist; I’m not a nut.”
– Justice Antonin Scalia4

 Professor of Law and Director of the Alona Cortese Elder Law Center at Chapman
University Fowler School of Law. J.D., UC Berkeley School of Law, 1984. B.A., Rice
University, 1981. I would like to thank Clare Pastore for her invaluable comments and
editing help on this Article. I would also like to thank Scott Altman, Steve Hitchcock, Joel
Farrell, Katherine Eggert, and Nicholas Westberg for their thoughtful comments and
Laura Fry for her advice on research methods. This Article was presented at the 2021
Chapman Law Review annual symposium, A Discussion on the Nondelegation and
Chevron Deference Doctrine, and I appreciate the comments of the other panelists in the
session on nondelegation, Richard Epstein and Jack Beermann, and the moderator Tom
Campbell. Members of the Chapman Law Review have provided outstanding editing and
support, especially Sirine Yared and Ariel Romero. Any errors are of course mine.
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 268 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
2 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989).
3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 251 (James Madison) (emphasis in the original).
4 Jeremy Telman, Explication Du Texte: "I'm An Originalist; I'm A Textualist; I'm
Not A Nut", 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 629, 629 (2016).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The originalist defenders of the nondelegation doctrine, the
purported constitutional rule that Congress cannot delegate its
legislative rule-making power to federal agencies, have
constructed an elaborate myth to justify that doctrine, which is
found nowhere in the Constitution. According to the originalist
myth, John Locke articulated that doctrine in his Second
Treatise of Government of 16895 and so influenced the Framers
of the Constitution that they somehow worked it implicitly and
invisibly into the Constitution. And hence the Constitution’s
original meaning includes the nondelegation doctrine. Such
nondelegation defenders assert that the Constitution strictly
limits the delegation of legislative power by Congress, even if it
does not prohibit it entirely, and that there is a veritable trove of
evidence showing that the nondelegation doctrine was firmly
established at the Founding. Some treat James Madison as the
patron saint of the separation of powers and argue that the fact
that Madison unsuccessfully attempted to include the
nondelegation doctrine in the Constitution shows that it is
somehow inherent in that document.
None of that myth is true. Or rather, the available historical
evidence strongly indicates that the myths asserted by such
defenders of the nondelegation doctrine are false. Locke’s
greatest influence on the colonists came before the Revolution, at
a time when the colonists were considering whether to revolt
from Britain. Once the Revolutionary War started, Locke’s
influence in the colonies plummeted. At the Constitutional
Convention, Locke had little apparent influence, and even that
seems to have been on the Anti-Federalists, rather than with the
Framers. The drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution little
discussed the delegation of legislative powers, let alone what
limits there should be to such delegation. Madison was far more
concerned, even fearful, that Congress would encroach on the
powers of the Executive and the Judiciary than he was about
Congress excessively delegating its powers. Madison even urged
including in the Constitution provisions that would have
mandated that some legislative policy-making power be
delegated to the Executive and the judiciary, in the form of a
Council of Revision, a council made up of the Executive and
selected members of the national judiciary to exercise what was
then called the revisionary power.
5

1980).

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
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When a nondelegation provision was proposed at the
Constitutional Convention, it was rejected. When an amendment
was proposed to the Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights that
would have prohibited each branch of the government from
employing the powers of another branch, it was rejected by the
Senate. Congress, since its inception, has delegated legislative
power with relative abandon, and doing so was not held
unconstitutional until 1935 and never again after that year.
Why would originalists push such obvious and unconvincing
myths? How could a supposed “constitutional doctrine” rejected for
the Constitution and which has been meaningly employed only
twice even be said to exist in any meaningful way? Worse yet, why
does it appear that, to seize greater control of America’s governance,
the now starkly conservative Supreme Court may well use
originalism to justify creating a brand new and robust version of the
long dormant nondelegation doctrine? This novel creation would be,
some originalists argue, justified by then-secret debates at the
Constitutional Convention, by a pre-Revolutionary War pamphlet
arguing that Parliament should recognize the legislative power of
colonial legislatures, by a personal letter written decades later
about the influences on the Revolution, by a hoary misunderstood
agency maxim that seems to have sprung from a medieval printing
error, by one of Locke’s writings that little influenced the drafters of
the Constitution, by early legislation that actually delegated
legislative power, and by court cases well after the Founding that
permitted legislative delegation, among other unconvincing sources.
To explain why originalist defenders would defend a
nondelegation doctrine unsupported by evidence at the Founding,
this article examines another myth, that of originalism itself, the
idea that the “intentions of the founders” as a group of drafters or
ratifiers or that the original public meaning of words in the
Constitution can be ascertained in such an accurate and
meaningful way that they should determine the meaning of the
Constitution. This article also criticizes the idea that the
Supreme Court should rely on its own judgement of arcane and
disputed historical facts and the complex context in which they
occurred as a basis to overturn centuries of its own precedent in
interpreting the Constitution. These two myths, the myth of the
nondelegation doctrine and the myth of an originalist method
valid enough to breathe life into it, wind around and support
each other. The nondelegation doctrine would remain dormant if
not dead but for originalism. A revived nondelegation doctrine
would be originalism’s greatest triumph, as it would give an
originalist Supreme Court a self-created, ill-defined, and
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virtually uncontrollable license to overturn any regulatory
legislation that the Court disfavored for policy reasons.
A revived nondelegation doctrine would transform the
Supreme Court into a far more powerful version of the rejected
Council of Revision, a proposal that was scrapped at the
Convention because it would have turned judges into legislators,
violated the separation of powers, and upset the balance of those
powers. A new robust nondelegation doctrine would go even
further, as no one could override the veto power that the
Supreme Court would give itself anytime Congress directed
federal agencies to craft regulations and make decisions that the
Court decides Congress should make for itself. The Court would
not have to share this mighty veto power with the President, nor
could Congress override the Court’s veto. The Court would be
granting itself an awesome policy power that would be almost
impossible for Congress to resist or the people to remove, because
the doctrine would be considered an implicit constitutional
doctrine that must be enforced both on Congress and on the
Executive Branch. And it is hard to imagine that the
Constitution would be amended to remove the nondelegation
doctrine, something that is not even there.
If the Supreme Court creates a robust nondelegation
doctrine, it would seize the power to control the size of the
administrative state and the scope of regulatory legislation in a
way not authorized by the Constitution, rejected by the founders
when they rejected the Council of Revision, and virtually
untouchable by the people themselves or the members of
Congress who represent them. Originalism would have seized
power for a “Government by Judiciary,” the very danger which
was the original basis for originalism and was the title of the
“manifesto of originalism,” Raoul Berger’s 1977 book that helped
spark the originalist movement, a book warning of the grave
peril of the Supreme Court Justices seizing such policy-making
power and imposing their will on the nation by revising
constitutional mandates to fit their policy preferences.6
This article uses the current debate about delegation at the
Founding and the new evidence uncovered, including evidence
that this article brings to this debate, to examine whether the
original intent or original public meaning at the Founding should
be a deciding factor in a court’s decision about the nondelegation
6 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 417 (1977) (“Among the most fundamental [principles of the
Constitution] is the exclusion of the judiciary from policymaking.”).
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doctrine. To the debate over delegation or nondelegation at the
Founding, this article adds a comprehensive analysis of
Madison’s changing and contradictory views on the separation of
powers and the usefulness and effect of an express nondelegation
doctrine in the Constitution, his grave fear that Congress would
usurp the powers of the other branches, and his support of a
proposed Council of Revision, which would have constitutionally
mandated the delegation of some legislative power to a council
made up of the Executive and a group of judges.
Madison at various times attempted to add an express
nondelegation or alternatively a non-encroachment doctrine to
the Constitution, the latter of which would have forbidden one
branch of government from usurping the powers of the other
branches.7 Madison also argued that express doctrines in
constitutions
are
ineffective
protections
against
the
accumulations of the various powers in one branch. At least once,
he also asserted that limitations on delegation are mandated by
the Constitution despite their absence from the Constitution.
The Article also uses decades of work by historians to
disprove a central claim of originalists that Locke and his Second
Treatise were a great influence on the drafting of the
Constitution. The consensus view among historians now seems to
be that Locke’s influence in America plummeted with the start of
the Revolutionary Warand that his Second Treatise had little
influence on the drafting or ratification of the Constitution.
Without the crutch of Locke’s Second Treatise, originalists have
virtually no evidence that the Constitution was intended to
contain an implicit nondelegation doctrine.8 The Article further
argues that the Court enforcing a robust nondelegation doctrine
would constitute judicially amending the Constitution to include
restrictions and principles not only absent from the Constitution
but also that the Framers and the First Congress expressly
rejected.
This Article uses the nondelegation debate as a lens to see
whether originalism as it is currently practiced is a useful or
dangerous tool of constitutional interpretation. It builds on
existing criticisms of originalism and how it has morphed largely
from a theory of judicial restraint into an antimajoritarian call to
judicial action, urging “judicial fortitude,” the conservative term

7 CAROL BERKIN, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE FIGHT TO SECURE AMERICA'S LIBERTIES
152 (2016).
8 Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282 (2021).
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for judicial activism and the idea that the Court should actively
assert its judicial power in an effort to rein in the administrative
state.9 Justice Gorsuch, in a recent dissent, argued that the
Court should exhibit “fortitude” in reviving the nondelegation
doctrine,10 very different from the judicial restraint Justice Scalia
applied to nondelegation. Many have noted that originalism can
be used as a mere cloak to hide courts’ asserting their policy
preferences in the guise of honoring the intent of the Founders,
and that while originalists once urged judicial restraint, now
many applaud a now conservative Supreme Court striking down
legislation enacted by Congress. However, this Article makes a
separate point, that the “judicial fortitude” some originalists
encourage directly violates the limited and non-policy-making
role of the Court as expressed in the Founding Era.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the history of
the nondelegation doctrine, its absence in the Constitution, the
various theories designed to explain its existence, and the mere lip
service it has received from the Court, other than during a single
year. It then discusses Madison’s various efforts to include both a
nondelegation doctrine and a non-encroachment amendment in
the text of the Constitution, as well as his support for the creation
of a Council of Revision, which would have delegated some
legislative power to the Executive and a group of judges. Locke’s
nondelegation mandate and historians’ assessment of what little
influence it seems to have had on the Framers is also discussed, as
well as other explanations and justifications for a constitutional
nondelegation doctrine.
Part II recounts the origins of originalism, its initial
emphasis on judicial restraint and on the avoidance of interfering
in legislative policy-making. Then, it discusses how originalism’s
initial focus on the framers’ original intent was rejected by many
originalist theorists and replaced, first with the understanding of
the ratifiers of the Constitution and then with the original public
meaning of the words of the Constitution. The Article discusses
the unworkable difficulty of putting modern originalism into
practice. It also discusses how the many forms and mutations of
originalism allow judges to choose how to apply originalism to
achieve their favored policy results.

9 See generally PETER J. WALLISON, JUDICIAL FORTITUDE: THE LAST CHANCE TO
REIN IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 109–36 (2018) (asserting the importance of a revived
nondelegation doctrine to control the power of federal agencies).
10 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by
Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Part III examines how originalism works in practice in
justifying and discussing the nondelegation doctrine. It reviews
the
originalist
concurrences
and
dissents
regarding
nondelegation that some Supreme Court Justices have authored
in recent decades, applying a flawed, primitive form of
originalism sometimes based on historical error or lack of
context. Then the Article concludes with an analysis of originalist
scholars’ attempts to justify the nondelegation doctrine and what
their attempts show about the flaws and challenges of employing
originalism as a method of constitutional analysis.
II. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE, ITS MYSTERIOUS HISTORY,
AND THE STAKES OF THE CURRENT DEBATE
The nondelegation doctrine was succinctly stated by Justice
Harlan in 1892: “That congress cannot delegate legislative
power . . . is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained
by the Constitution.”11 This assertion has been often repeated,
even recently by Justice Scalia in a unanimous decision by the
Supreme Court, stating “‘Article I, § 1, of the Constitution vests
‘[a]ll legislative Power herein granted . . . in a Congress of the
United States’ . . . [and] permits no delegation of those powers.”12
Defenders of the nondelegation doctrine typically use three
arguments in their defense: “the separation of powers, public
accountability, or the text of the U.S. Constitution.”13 Reasons
given for the associated separation of powers doctrine are
governmental efficiency, keeping government powers in balance,
and assuring that law is made for the common good.14 If the
nondelegation doctrine is vital to the structure of government, it
serves as “a prophylactic measure against tyranny. . .”15 To these
should be added the claim that the original intent of the Framers
mandates a nondelegation doctrine, absent even words in the
Constitution expressly stating that.
The nondelegation doctrine appears nowhere in the Constitution,
leading to questions about whether it is in fact a constitutional
mandate. Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley boldly assert:
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, §1).
13 Joseph Postell, "The People Surrender Nothing": Social Compact Theory,
Republicanism, and the Modern Administrative State, 81 MO. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2016).
14 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers As Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1994 (2011).
15 Martin H. Redish, Pragmatic Formalism, Separation of Powers, and the Need to
Revisit the Nondelegation Doctrine, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 383 (2019).
11
12
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“The nondelegation doctrine has nothing to do with the Constitution as
it was originally understood. You can be an originalist or you can be
committed to the nondelegation doctrine. But you can’t be both.”16
Posner and Vermeule make the straightforward claim that the
“nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and
structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound economic and
political theory.”17 Why do we have the nondelegation doctrine, then?
Their reply: “Nondelegation is nothing more than a controversial
theory that floated around the margins of nineteenth-century
constitutionalism—a theory that wasn’t clearly adopted by the
Supreme Court until 1892, and even then only in dictum.”18
As the Supreme Court is now filled with Justices with an
originalist bent, a fraught question or a great opportunity,
depending on whom you ask, is whether the Court will finally set
in place a stricter, more robust nondelegation doctrine. A strict
nondelegation doctrine could, as Elena Kagan noted, render most
of government unconstitutional, “dependent as Congress is on the
need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its
programs.”19 As a law professor, now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett
and her co-author stated, “Adherence to originalism arguably
requires, for example, the dismantling of the administrative
state. . . . Originalists have been pressed to either acknowledge
that their theory could generate major disruption or identify a
principled exception . . .” explaining why judges should not be
bound by the Constitution’s original public meaning.20
Some originalists and others opposed to expansive nature of
the administrative state harbor hopes that if a majority of the
Court adopt an originalist view of the nondelegation doctrine,
they will decide that it must be more strictly applied and so trim
what they perceive as the dangerous power of federal agencies.
For example, Peter Wallison argues that, without a stricter
nondelegation jurisprudence, “forcing Congress to do the difficult
work of legislating, we are headed ultimately for a form of
government in which a bureaucracy in Washington – and not
Congress – will make the major policy decisions for the

Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 282.
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002).
18 Id. (citing Field v. Clark, 143 US 649, 692 (1892)).
19 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).
20 Amy C. Barrett & John C. Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1, 1–2 (2016). The authors, though, emphasize “We do not ourselves undertake to
examine how any of the precedents we mention would fare under an originalist
analysis.” Id. at 2 n.1.
16
17
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country.”21 Wallison calls such strong measures “judicial
fortitude,”22 a term much more palatable to originalists than
judicial activism.
The recent dissent of Justice Gorsuch in Gundy indicating
interest in revitalizing the nondelegation doctrine has kicked up
the interest in an originalist approach to the doctrine into a fever
pitch.23 Justice Gorsuch attempting to revive the nondelegation
doctrine should have come as no surprise since he had twice
discussed the doctrine while serving on the 10th Circuit.24 Justice
Alito, concurring in Gundy, also indicated interest in reviving the
nondelegation doctrine.25 Gary Lawson noted in 2019, “And while
you never count your votes until they are cast, it is very hard to
read Gundy and not count to five under your breath.”26 With new
Justice Amy Comey Barrett, the number might well be six.
The nondelegation doctrine has been one of the main
battlegrounds “upon which the constitutionality of the growth of
federal regulatory authority was tested”27 and that battle is now
heated. Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent28 raises the question of
whether a now much more conservative Court will restrict
Congress’s ability to draft the kind of regulatory legislation that
is dependent on delegating significant rule-making authority to
federal agencies. Advocates for a stricter nondelegation doctrine
have argued that an unchecked administrative state without
restrictions like a robust nondelegation doctrine would be “in the
Framers’ eyes, tyrannical and illegitimate,”29 and that the
nondelegation doctrine could check what C. Boyden Gray called
See WALLISON, supra note 9, at 114.
Id. at 166.
See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116.
See United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 948 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). See also United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 668 (10th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). In Nichols, then-Judge
Gorsuch in a dissent stated, “There's “[t]here's ample evidence, too, that the framers of
the Constitution thought the compartmentalization of legislative power not just a tool of
good government or necessary to protect the authority of Congress from encroachment by
the Executive but essential to the preservation of the people's liberty.” Id.
25 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this
Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I
would support that effort.”).
26 Gary Lawson, “I'm Leavin' It (All) Up To You”: Gundy and the (Sort-Of)
Resurrection of The Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 33 (2019).
27 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 479 (1989).
28 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
29 D.A. Candeub, Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 94 (2017)
(“Administrative law will continue to sit uneasily with our legal and constitutional
traditions and remain, in the Framers' eyes, tyrannical and illegitimate.”).
21
22
23
24

Do Not Delete

716

5/19/2021 12:57 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:3

the “unprecedented expansion of the administrative state.”30 A
more robust nondelegation doctrine could change the United
States’ policy on a myriad of issues, including environmental
protection, financial services oversight, and occupational health
and safety.31 It could strike cost containment strategies in
Medicare and under Obamacare,32 parts of economic relief
programs like the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)33 and
financial regulation like Dodd Frank.34
However, there is a gigantic sticking point to the originalist
push to revive the nondelegation doctrine. Originalists assert
that the meaning of the Constitution was fixed at its ratification
(and the meaning of each amendment fixed at the time it was
passed). Hence, originalists must prove that the Constitution
contained a rule against delegation when it was ratified.
However, the Constitution is silent on whether Congress can
delegate its legislative power, and even originalists disagree
whether it can.35 How can the Constitution mean something it is
silent about? One of the strongest defenses of originalism is
based on the fact that the Constitution is a written text, and that
originalism is somehow mandated by it being a written
constitution.36 How can originalism then purport to justify a
doctrine not written in the Constitution?
If the Framers had wanted to limit Congress’s delegation of
its legislative powers, they had several choices. One option is
that they could have included the nondelegation doctrine as an
express term in the Constitution or an early amendment thereto.
This was proposed and rejected during the Constitutional
Convention and a similar non-encroachment clause, forbidding
each branch from using powers of another branch, was rejected
30 C.
Boyden Gray, The Nondelegation Canon's Neglected History and
Underestimated Legacy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 619, 646 (2015).
31 Id. at 620–21 (“Correcting those misconceptions [about the nondelegation
doctrine] is crucial, not just for abstract constitutional debate, but more importantly, for
the regulatory policy choices the United States government now faces.”).
32 Ilya Shapiro & Carl G. DeNigris, Occupy Pennsylvania Avenue: How the Government's
Unconstitutional Actions Hurt the 99%, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2012).
33 Id. at 1098–99.
34 Id. at 1109–10 (referring to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010).
35 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its
Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 905–06 (2009) (“Congress may, in the
exercise of its assigned powers, delegate whatever discretion it likes, pursuant to
whatever strict or lax standards it chooses, to administrative agencies within the
executive branch. So long as Congress retains the authority to undo the delegation,
delegation is a form of exercise of its legislative power, not a relinquishment of it.”).
36 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 47 (1999).
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as part of the Bill of Rights, as is discussed in Part A which
follows. A second option is that the Framers, by vesting the
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers in separate branches,
could have trusted that the separation of powers, along with
other defensive tools, would cause and allow each branch to
zealously guard its own powers and delegate them only when
they could limit and control the delegation, and when the
delegation furthered the branch’s purpose. Madison described the
separation of powers and associated defensive means as “the
great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department,” as the ambition of each
department would prevent it from giving too much of its power to
another branch.37 A third option is that the Framers could have
intended, in addition to or as a result of the separation of powers,
that an implicit nondelegation doctrine exist somehow in the
fabric or penumbra of the Constitution even though they did not
publicly discuss this during the drafting or ratification of the
Constitution and rejected it for the text. There were no doubt
other options, but this last one seems highly unlikely. If the
Framers thought that the nondelegation doctrine were at all
important, they likely would have included it in the
Constitution’s text, not leave it as a doctrine written in air. And
this option is also the least effective, given the long dormancy of
the nondelegation doctrine and the ongoing debate about
whether it even exists as a constitutional mandate.
Seen in this light, originalists’ efforts to create a new, more
stringent nondelegation doctrine would not return the
Constitution to its original meaning but rather would force into
the Constitution terms that were rejected at the Founding.
Originalists would have the Supreme Court amend the
Constitution to include the terms and principles the Framers and
First Congress rejected. Worse yet, a robust nondelegation
doctrine would undermine the separation of powers as set by the
Constitution, as the Court would be giving itself an ill-defined,
uncontrollable license to overturn even long-standing regulatory
legislation with which a majority of the Court disagrees. A robust
nondelegation doctrine would empower the Court to overturn
major policy decisions by Congress, both current and decades old,
regarding the scope and method of environment protection,
health care and insurance regulation, financial services
regulation, and a myriad of other policy choices that should be
left to Congress.

37

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 268 (James Madison).
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A. Madison, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and the Separation of
Powers in the Constitution
The nondelegation doctrine is found nowhere in the
Constitution.38 However, Madison was involved in two attempts
to insert into the Constitution clauses intended to prevent one
branch of government from using the powers of another branch.
Madison also was a proponent of adding to the Constitution a
Council of Revision, which would have blended the separate
powers and enabled a council made up of the President and
members of the federal judiciary to review every act of Congress
and give the Council of Revision a tool to revise legislation and a
qualified veto of Congressional legislation on policy as well as
constitutional grounds.39
Early during the Constitutional Convention while considering
a very weak executive power, Madison’s notes indicate the
proposal to fix the powers of the Executive to be “with power to
carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not
otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers ‘not
Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature,’ as may from time to time
be delegated by the national Legislature.”40 In other words,
Congress could delegate non-legislative powers to the Executive,
but not legislative powers. The words “not legislative nor judiciary
in their nature” were added to this proposed amendment, Madison
indicated, “in consequence of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that
improper powers might otherwise be delegated.”41
However, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney’s second
cousin, Charles Pinckney, moved that the limitation on
delegation be stricken, saying “they were unnecessary, the object
of them being included in the ‘power to carry into effect the
national laws.’” Madison’s notes indicate that he “did not know
that the words were absolutely necessary. . . He did not however
see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might
happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and
misconstructions.”42 Madison’s notes indicate his own thoughts
and how he equivocated about the necessity of including in the
Constitution an express nondelegation clause. This is hardly a
38 Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87,
89 (2010) (“The Constitution's text is of little help, for it says nothing explicit about
delegating the power Article I confers.”).
39 See BERGER, supra note 6, at 300–11.
40 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 65 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1911) (emphasis added).
41 Id.
42 Id.
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stirring endorsement of a nondelegation doctrine or strong
evidence that Madison thought the doctrine definitely should be
included explicitly in the Constitution.
Charles Pinckney’s motion to strike was based on the
argument that the object of the added words was already
included, though what exactly that means is not entirely clear. It
could mean that the purpose of a bar on nondelegation was
already achieved through other means or that the Executive
power somehow already carried a limitation on using delegated
legislative power in it, depending what the “object” is.43 At this
point, the drafters were undecided on what form the Executive
should take, unitary or plural,44 and the drafters were focused on
defining the reach of Executive power.45 This bar on delegation
may have stricken as redundant because at that point in the
Constitution’s drafting, the powers of the Executive were much
more sharply limited than they later would be in the final
Constitution and “were confined to appointment and
execution. . .”46 When the Executive powers were broadened,
however, no express nondelegation clause was inserted. The
nondelegation provision may have been defeated because it was
viewed as unnecessary, which to Posner and Vermeule “suggests,
if anything, that legislative delegation to the executive was
viewed as unproblematic.”47
Madison was also a proponent of a proposal at the
Constitutional Convention that would have blended the powers of
the Executive and Judicial branches with that of the Legislative
by establishing a Council of Revision, a body of the Executive and
“a convenient number of the National Judiciary” to weigh in on
laws as they were drafted to help Congress make better laws by
participating in their revision, and with a power of veto qualified
by the fact that it could be overridden by the legislature.48 The

43 Id.; see also Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 718, 743 (2019)
(observing that Charles Pinckney, who moved to strike the phrase, and Edmund
Randolph, who seconded the motion, both “felt that this limitation was inherent in the
executive's power to ‘carry into effect’ the laws . . . .”).
44 For example, Governor Edmund Randolph argued that a unitary executive is “the
foetus of monarchy.” See Michael W. McConnell, James Wilson's Contributions to the
Construction of Article II, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 32–33 (2019).
45 Id. at 46 (“In this connection, it is suggestive that Madison . . . (and C.C.
Pinckney) sought to limit executive power by denying to the President powers ‘not
legislative nor judiciary in their nature’ . . . .”).
46 Id. at 36 (“The result was a mere shadow of the ‘energetic’ and powerful executive
that Wilson and Rutledge evidently had in mind, which would eventually emerge from the
Convention.”).
47 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1734.
48 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 21.
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Executive and the judges making up the Council of Revision
would thus have both the negative legislative power of a qualified
veto and also the positive legislative power to review laws and
assert their opinions and suggestions for revision, opinions given
weight by the threat of veto.
James Wilson supported the Council of Revision, saying that
“Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be
destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the
Judges in refusing to give them effect.”49 Wilson urged that the
council have “a share in the Revisionary power” so that “they will
have an opportunity of taking notice of these character[istics] of a
law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the
improper views of the Legislature.”50 The Council of Revision
would have allowed judges and the Executive to weigh in during
the legislative drafting and revising process on whether laws
were good policy and with their suggestions for improvement,
even if the proposed laws were constitutional.51 Thus, the Council
of Revision would have given the Executive and the judicial
members both qualified negative legislative power but also some
positive legislative power during the drafting and revision
process.52 “According to Madison, good lawmaking required the
input of judicial minds at the outset.”53 Madison noted that some
might object that the Council of Revision might “give too much
strength either to the Executive or Judiciary” or would constitute
a violation of the separation of powers as “a union of the Judiciary &
Executive branches in the revision of the laws. . .”54 but was not
concerned about the other branches gaining such legislative
power. “Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful
tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex.
This was the real source of danger to the American
Constitutions. . .”55 Madison’s great concern was not the risk of
excessive legislative delegation by Congress but rather the
likelihood of excessive encroachment by Congress on an
Executive and a Judiciary unable to protect themselves. He
defended the Council of Revision against the charge it would
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. For this point, see also James T. Barry III, The Council of Revision and the
Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 250–51 (1989).
52 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 73.
53 Barry III, supra note 51, at 250.
54 Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, [21 July] 1787, FOUNDERS
ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-020067 [http://perma.cc/SL2W-TSTK] (citing 10 James Madison, The Papers of James
Madison 109–110 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)).
55 Id.
49
50
51
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breach the separation of powers by arguing that giving the
Executive and the judiciary this power over Congress would be
“an auxiliary precaution in favor of” the separation of powers.56
Far from denouncing this delegation of legislative power as an
assault on the separation of powers, Madison argued it would
help preserve that separation.
Madison’s notes show he meant this delegation of legislative
power to give the Executive and the judiciary policy-making
power and to protect the rights of the public: “In short, whether
the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the
Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate
Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from
passing laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form,
the utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to
the Executive seemed incontestable.”57 Some originalists claim
that Congress delegating legislative power could oppress the
public. Madison stated that the Constitution in fact should
delegate some legislative power, primarily negative but also a
positive revisionary power, to the other branches to prevent
Congress from encroaching on the rights of the people at large.
Suppressing legislative delegation seems in direct contradiction
to Madison’s proposal and in opposition to Madison’s fears that a
too-powerful Congress would encroach on the rights of the people.
Madison went further in arguing for the delegation of
legislative power to the executive and judicial branches in his
1788 observations on Jefferson’s draft for Virginia’s
constitution.58 There, Madison suggested that the executive and
judicial branches be given a revisionary power meant as a “check
to precipitate, to unjust, and to unconstitutional laws” that might
be passed by the legislature.59 Madison proposed that all bills be
transmitted by the legislature to the executive and judicial
branches and that: “If either of these object, let ⅔, if both ¾ of
each House be necessary to overrule the objection. . .”60
If either the executive or judicial branch objects that the bill
is unconstitutional, Madison’s proposal would have required that
Id.
Revisionary Power of the Executive and the Judiciary, [6 June] 1787, FOUNDERS
ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-020022 [http://perma.cc/6GF4-BQPR] (citing 10 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 35–36 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)).
58 James Madison, Observations on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (1788), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch17s25.html
[http://perma.cc/UE2E-7EJB].
59 Id.
60 Id.
56
57
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the bill be suspended until the next election and a repassage of
the bill “by ⅔ or ¾ of both Houses, as the case may be” and that
upon such override, neither the judiciary or the executive could
pronounce it unconstitutional.61 Madison was urging even
greater delegation of legislative power, in that the judicial and
executive branches each had the power to veto legislation, and
that even if the legislature had the votes to overrule such veto, if
the objection by either the Executive or the judiciary were that
the bill was unconstitutional, no override was possible and any
repassage of the bill would have to wait until after the next
election, when new legislators might be seated and would
reconsider.
This great power over the legislature by the judicial and
executive branches would constitute a stunning breach of the
separation of powers. And Madison’s odd twist that the
legislature could repass the bill in a way that made it
impregnable from constitutional challenge would allow the
legislature to usurp the courts’ power to determine the
constitutionality of such legislation. Madison had idiosyncratic
ideas of how to defend the separation of powers and ones that
might astonish those who would consider his intentions as a
binding guide to how our government should function. If
originalist Justices want to import Madison’s ideas into the
Constitution, perhaps they should start with the idea that
Congress can pass legislation in a way that makes it impregnable
from the Court’s constitutional review. That would certainly
shake up the separation of powers.
Opponents to the Council of Revision complained that judges
should not be legislators, interfere in legislative business, or
meddle in politics.62 The Convention voted twice on the proposal
for a Council of Revision, and it was twice voted down.63
Madison was involved in another attempt to insert
something akin to the nondelegation doctrine into the
Constitution through an amendment explicitly stating that no
branch of the national government could exercise powers
delegated by the Constitution to another department. Madison
initially proposed this as an amendment to the text of the
Constitution.64 When Madison’s proposed textual amendments
Id.
See BERGER, supra note 6, at 302.
Barry III, supra note 51, at 257.
BERKIN, supra note 7, at 152. Madison’s proposed amendments stated, “Eighthly.
That immediately after article 6th, be inserted, as article 7th, the clauses following, to
wit: The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the departments to
61
62
63
64
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were transformed into a proposed bill of rights to be appended to
the Constitution, it included as a Sixteenth Amendment:
The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the
departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the
legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the
executive or judicial nor the executive exercise the powers vested in
the legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested
in the legislative or executive departments.65

Wurman refers to this as the “Nondelegation Amendment.”66 This
is not a nondelegation amendment, but rather a non-encroachment
amendment, in that it does not forbid delegation explicitly, but only
prevents each branch from exercising and hence encroaching on
powers vested in another branch. How significant that difference is of
course is open to dispute. Madison’s non-encroachment amendment
seems part of Madison’s continuing effort to prevent Congress from
usurping the powers of the other branches, rather than an attempt to
prevent legislative delegation, especially given Madison’s failed effort
to create a Council of Revision that would have delegated some
legislative power to the other branches in order to prevent Congress
from encroaching on executive or judicial turf.
Representative Sherman objected to Madison’s non-encroachment
amendment as “altogether unnecessary, inasmuch as the Constitution
assigned the business of each branch of the Government to a separate
department.”67 Sherman’s objection could well indicate that he thought
a ban on encroachment was unnecessary, as the branches would use
the constitutional means at their disposal to guard their powers out of
self-interest, which Madison stated in Federalist 51 was the “great
security” against the concentration of powers in one branch, as will be
discussed.68
Madison agreed with Sherman’s objection, possibly in
recognition of the “great security” provided by each branch’s
jealous protections of their powers combined with their
constitutional means of defense, but also “supposed the people
would be gratified with the amendment, as it was admitted that
the powers ought to be separate and distinct; it might also tend
to an explanation of some doubts that might arise respecting the

which they are respectively distributed: so that the Legislative Department shall never
exercise the powers vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the Executive exercise the
powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor the Judicial exercise the powers vested in
the Legislative or Executive Departments.” Id.
65 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (1789) (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834).
66 Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 15, 16–17 (2020).
67 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 65, at 760.
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 268 (James Madison).
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construction of the Constitution.”69 Madison seemed to indicate
he thought that his amendment would add something to the
Constitution, but exactly what is not clear. Another
representative condemned the amendment as “subversive of the
Constitution,” which seems to indicate the idea that an express
non-encroachment clause would cause significant damage to the
structure of the Constitution.70 While the non-encroachment
amendment passed the House of Representatives, it was struck
in the Senate,71 the records of which give no indication of reasons
for editing or rejecting any of the proposed amendments.72
Some originalists argue that these failed attempts to include
the nondelegation doctrine or a non-encroachment clause in the
Constitution indicate somehow that it is already there.73. Ilan
Wurman argued that Madison included the nondelegation
doctrine to be “doubly sure.”74 Clearly, Madison and at least a few
others thought at various times that either a nondelegation or a
non-encroachment doctrine should be included in the
Constitution and were concerned that the some might think that
the separation of powers would not be sufficient to prevent
delegation of legislative powers. However, the Senate rejecting
the non-encroachment doctrine is evidence that the
nondelegation doctrine did not make it into the Constitution, not
proof that it was already there. If the Court were now to read
into the Constitution a strict nondelegation doctrine, it would in
essence be amending the Constitution to include terms similar to
the proposed amendment to the Constitution rejected during its
drafting or to some extent akin to Madison’s proposed Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution rejected by the Senate.
Madison wrestled with how to prevent the legislative branch
from encroaching on the Executive and Judicial Branches, at
times advocating a nondelegation or non-encroachment doctrines
to be included in the Constitution, at times supporting a proposal
to allow the Executive and Judicial Branch to be empowered to
participate in legislative power, at other times arguing the

1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 65, at 453.
Id. at 760–61 (statement of Representative Livermore).
Wurman, supra note 66, at 17.
ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER 162 (1997) (“The stark
reportage of the Senate Journal provides not the slightest clue to the Senate’s reasons for
these deletions. . .” including striking the sixteenth article on nondelegation.).
73 Wurman, supra note 66, at 16–17. See also Gordon, supra note 43, at 743–44.
74 Wurman, supra note 66, at 16 (“Here are two prominent representatives, both key
players in the Constitutional Convention, arguing that a nondelegation amendment was
unnecessary. Madison further argued that it was better to be doubly sure and make the
principle explicit.”).
69
70
71
72

Do Not Delete

2021]

5/19/2021 12:57 PM

Originalism Isn’t What It Used to Be

725

ineffectiveness of such a rigid, express separation of powers and
defending its absence in the Constitution, and at least once
indicating that he thought some limits on delegation were
included in the Constitution. Madison discussed delegation
extensively in the Federalist Papers arguing for the ratification
of the Constitution. In Federalist 47, Madison addressed the
criticism that the Constitution did not sufficiently separate the
powers of government, which he called “[o]ne of the principal
objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the
Constitution. . .”75 Madison noted the importance of the
separation of powers, stating that the “accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”76
To address these concerns about the separation of powers,
Madison said “The oracle who is always consulted and cited on
this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. . . [who] has the
merit . . . of displaying and recommending it most effectually to
the attention of mankind”77 Madison failed even to mention
Locke, however, showing Locke’s striking unimportance.
Montesquieu, Madison asserted, “appears to have viewed the
Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own
expression, as the mirror of political liberty” and so Madison
examined the British system of separation of powers, to
determine whether the Constitution fell short. Madison noted
that the powers were not strictly separated under the
Constitution of England, and that part of the legislative branch
acts as a “great constitutional council to the executive chief” and
is “invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction.”78
From such examples, Madison concluded that Montesquieu
did not advocate a strict separation of powers, and that “it may
clearly be inferred that, in saying ‘There can be no liberty where
the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or body of magistrates,’ . . . [Montesquieu] did not mean
that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in,
or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other.”79 Madison seems to
be asserting that under Montesquieu’s principles, Congress
could, without undue risk, make the Executive Branch
Congress’s agent, with Congressional control. Some of the
75
76
77
78
79

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 249–55 (James Madison).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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defenders of the nondelegation doctrine claim that the original
meaning of the Constitution mandates that Congress, as the
agent of the people, cannot delegate its powers to the Executive
Branch as its sub-agent,80 but Madison’s words seem to refute
that.
Madison states what he takes to be Montesquieu’s asserted
limits on delegation: “[Montesquieu’s] meaning, as his own words
import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example
in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the
WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the
fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.”81
The improper delegation then was that of the whole legislative
power, not a limited and directed delegation. Madison gave as an
example of excessive concentration of powers in one branch “if
the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also
the complete legislative power. . .” and thus read Montesquieu as
not advocating a complete separation of powers, “but rather in
favor of a modified, incomplete, separation of governmental
powers.”82
Madison noted that some states had express separation of
powers clauses in their state constitutions preventing each
branch from encroaching on the powers of the other branches,
but those did not effectively prevent the admixture of powers
among the branches. Madison specifically addresses the
Massachusetts state constitution, which stated: “that the
legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
or either of them.’’83 Madison indicates that such a declaration
“goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire
departments from exercising the powers of another department.
In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture
of powers has been admitted.”84 Madison then notes the failure of
such express language in state constitutions to prevent the
admixture of powers. “If we look into the constitutions of the
several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 251 (James Madison) (emphasis in original).
Id.
Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu's Theory of Government and the Framing of
the American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 34 (1990).
83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 , supra note 1, at 254 (James Madison).
84 Id.
80
81
82
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and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this
axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which
the several departments of power have been kept absolutely
separate and distinct.” and “in no instance has a competent
provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation
delineated on paper.”85 In defending the Constitution’s lack of
express lines drawn between the branches from critics
complaining about that absence, Madison points out how even
state constitutions that had express bars on branches using other
branches’ powers did not achieve a full separation of powers.
Madison returned to this subject in Federalist 48, stating
that what is impermissible is when one branch’s power is
“directly and completely administered by either of the other
departments. . .” and that the legislature is the great danger,
given that any “projects of usurpation by [the other branches]
would immediately betray and defeat themselves.”86 Congress
delegating specific legislative powers under its direction and
control clearly would not constitute its legislative power being
“directly and completely administered” by federal agencies, and
so appears to receive Madison’s blessing. Madison also asserted
that appeals to the populace would not effectively prevent the
accumulation of power in one branch of government.87
After determining that neither an express constitutional
prohibition on branches using other branches’ powers nor an
appeal to the people was sufficient to prevent encroachment by
one branch on the other, Madison, in Federalist 51, asserts that
only one method would be effective, a structure of government
with a separation of powers, so that “each department should
have a will of its own” and that each branch will keep the others
“in their proper places.”88 Madison concluded that the “great
security” against the accumulation of powers in one branch is
neither an express bar on branches using other branches’ powers
nor an appeal to the people, but rather, “giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”89
Once that structure is put in place, the people running each
Id.
See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 1 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 1, at 257 (James Madison).
88 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 267 (James Madison) (“The only answer
that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the
defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that
its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each
other in their proper places.”).
89 Id.
85
86
87
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branch would be driven to jealously protect their powers by their
own ambition. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.
The interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place.”90 In other words, the object of
a nondelegation or non-encroachment doctrine, to prevent the
accumulation of powers in one branch, is better accomplished
simply by the separation of powers and giving each branch
constitutional tools to resist encroachment, because the ambition
of the people in each branch will prevent the accumulation of
powers in any branch. By comparison, the nondelegation doctrine
would give the Court an offensive tool against both Congress and
the Executive, and allow the Court to interfere in the cooperation
between the two other branches. The power to delegate gives
Congress a defensive tool against the Executive Branch, in that
Congress can dictate to federal agencies and assign them tasks,
including rule-making. The nondelegation doctrine would strip
this defensive power from Congress. After Congress passes a law
and the President does not veto it, why should the Court
interfere in how they cooperate? The nondelegation doctrine is
not a defensive tool for the Court, as its judicial powers are not
threatened by congressional delegation to the Executive Branch.
Instead, the nondelegation doctrine would simply an offensive
weapon for the Court improperly to seize power from both
Congress and the Executive Branch.
Madison spoke again about delegation as a Virginia
Representative during the Post Roads Debate during the Second
Congress, in which members discussed whether they should set
the locations of post roads and post offices, a power vested in
them by the Constitution, or should delegate that task to the
President, as one motion proposed.91 The motion to delegate
failed, as the members debated whether the House had the duty
to set the locations of post roads and post offices, given that the
Constitution assigned the House that task and power.92 Madison
argued against the amendment, stating that “there did not
appear to be any necessity for alienating the powers of the
House; and that if this should take place, it would be a violation

Id.
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 606, 629 (1996) (“Representative Sedgwick moved to replace the detailed
specification of routes in the House bill with a direction that the mail should be carried
between Wiscasset, in the district of Maine, to Savannah, Georgia, ‘by such route as the
President of the United States shall, from time to time, cause to be established.’” (citing 3
ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (Gales & Seaton eds., 1849)).
92 Id. at 628–32.
90
91
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of the Constitution.”93 From this, Christine Kexel Chabot argued
that Madison may have had necessity in mind as a necessary
justification for delegation.94 However, she also noted that not
everyone agreed with Madison’s “‘necessity’ test” for delegation.95
Madison may have been commenting that by delegating that
power to the President, the House would lose it permanently,
because once the post roads and post offices, or any significant
number of them, were built, it would be impracticable for
Congress to undo the presidential plan. However, even despite
this objection, the House did eventually delegate to the President
the discretion to establish other roads as post roads.96 and
delegated to the Postmaster General the power to determine
where the post offices should be.97 As Mortenson and Bagley
note, “Far from demonstrating the force of Madison’s
constitutional objection, the statute as enacted expressly
conferred the open-ended authority that Madison had claimed
was unconstitutional during debate.”98 David Currie, after noting
extensive delegation to the Executive Branch regarding the
postal issues, indicated that a constitutional objection to
delegation may not have been the driving element in this debate,
stating, “Despite all the crocodile tears, one is tempted to
attribute the House’s zest for detail more to a taste for pork than
to a principled concern for the virtues of representative
government.”99
When deciding how to repay the enormous national debt, much
of which was incurred to fund the Revolutionary War,100 Congress
debated whether it could delegate its borrowing power provided
under Article I, Section 8. Chabot stated, “It is no surprise that
Madison referred to the borrowing law as a delegation of ‘great
trust’ that left key terms of loans and ‘execution of one of the most
important laws’ to the President.”101 Though one might imagine
that discussion of delegation would have “consume[d] the entire
debate” in the House of Representatives, this did not happen.102
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 239 (1791) (Gales & Seaton eds., 1849).
Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at the Founding, GA. L.
REV. (manuscript at 43) (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3654564.
95 Id. (manuscript at 41–42).
96 Id. (manuscript at 42).
97 Id. (manuscript at 43).
98 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 353.
99 Currie, supra note 91, at 631.
100 Chabot, supra note 94 (manuscript at 20).
101 Id. (manuscript at 4) (quoting LLOYD’S NOTES FROM MAY 19, 1790, reprinted in
DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SECOND SESSION: APRIL-AUGUST 1790, at
1349).
102 Id. (manuscript at 21).
93
94
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Instead, debate focused more on which member of the Executive
Branch should be delegated such borrowing power, with Madison
asserting that it should be the President.103 Instead of rejecting
congressional delegation, House members responded to the
constitutional concerns by supporting delegation “with some
limitation on the amount to be borrowed.”104
Another important example of delegation by Congress in its
first years was the Alien Friends Act of 1798,105 which authorized
the President to order aliens as he deemed dangerous to depart
the country. During the debates, the constitutionality of the act
was debated, not regarding delegation, but instead about which
of the enumerated powers of Congress justified the legislation.106
Throughout the debates, only two members “voiced anything that
bore a resemblance to a nondelegation argument.”107 Those
arguments failed and the legislation was passed.108 Wurman
notes that during the debate, no one argued that Congress could
freely delegate—an argument Wurman claims “they surely would
have been motivated to make if it were true.”109 That claim seems
off, since it is easy to see why only two nondelegation arguments
in the course of the debates would generate no pro-delegation
responses. Even so, Wurman admits, “It is certainly possible to
infer that the nondelegation principle itself was rejected, but
there is no way to know that with any degree of confidence.”110
In his Virginia Report of 1800, Madison, by then a member of
the Virginia legislature,111 returned to the topic of the Alien
Friends Act and its delegation of legislative power by Congress.
Madison noted, “Details, to a certain degree, are essential to the
nature and character of a law; and, on criminal subjects, it is
proper, that details should leave as little as possible to the
discretion of those who are to apply and to execute the law.”112
Congress should, he asserted, not grant “a general conveyance of

103 Id. (citing LLOYD’S NOTES FROM MAY 19, 1790, reprinted in DEBATES IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, SECOND SESSION: APRIL-AUGUST 1790, at 1354).

Id.
An Act Concerning Aliens, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798).
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 365.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Wurman, supra note 66, at 25.
Id. at 26.
111 H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 949, 962 n.72 (1993).
112 The Report of 1800 [7 January 1800], FOUNDERS ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0202
[http://perma.cc/5H5LCWBY] (citing 17 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 303–51 (David B.
Mattern et al. eds., 1991)).
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
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authority, without laying down any precise rules, by which the
authority conveyed, should be carried into effect. . .” because
otherwise “the whole power of legislation might be transferred by
the legislature from itself, and proclamations might become
substitutes for laws.”113
Madison stated the test of whether a law constitutes a
proper delegation and hence constitutional is “whether it
contains such details, definitions, and rules, as appertain to the
true character of a law; especially, a law by which personal
liberty is invaded, property deprived of its value to the owner,
and life itself indirectly exposed to danger.” And so, the question
is whether the law contains enough “details, definitions, and
rules” to appear to be a real law, and not just a handing off of the
legislative power to another branch.
These statements by Madison are notable in that they
include the claim that excessive delegation is unconstitutional. If
Madison’s intent as of 1800 alone were to determine the meaning
of the Constitution, then the nondelegation doctrine would be the
constitutional mandate that Congress can delegate only where it
has drafted a law with enough “details, definitions, and rules” to
appear to be a real law, which is a far cry from the claim that
Congress cannot delegate its legislative powers. Such a doctrine
would have the same hazards as the current intelligibility rule,
as it would not guide the courts in determining how much detail
is sufficient, however. And the post-Ratification interpretation of
one of the Framers, whose views on this subject varied over the
years, should not determine the meaning of the Constitution.
B. The Vesting Clauses, Separation of Powers, and Silence as
the Sources of the Nondelegation Doctrine
Given the absence of the nondelegation doctrine in the
Constitution, those asserting its importance have struggled to
determine its original basis. Any constitutional limitation of
delegation would have to be implicit, but proving an implicit
limitation on delegation would be a challenge “because
constitutional interpreters are properly reluctant to find implicit
restrictions on express textual grants” of congressional legislative
power, given that the detailed express restrictions in Article I,
Section 9 suggest “by negative implication that no other
limitations should be recognized.”114

113
114

Id.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1729.
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Those who seek a nondelegation doctrine with teeth search
for any constitutional basis for it, despite its absence in the
Constitution’s text. Some claim that nondelegation is a necessary
corollary to Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution,
which provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”115 However, Article
I does not specify what Congress can do with the legislative
power vested in it or whether it can delegate those powers. While
Article II vests Executive power in the President, few question
the President’s authority to delegate to federal agencies.116
Phillip Hamburger has argued strenuously that restrictions
on legislative delegation spring directly from the Vesting
Clauses, and that because the Constitution vests all legislative
power in Congress, Congress cannot delegate any of that
power.117 Hamburger asserts therefore that the nondelegation
doctrine should be “put aside—not on the grounds offered by
Professors Mortenson and Bagley, but because the Constitution
speaks instead in stronger terms about vesting.”118 In his 2014
book, Hamburger gives a fuller argument, relying heavily on the
word “all” in the legislative vesting clause. In contrast to the
judicial and executive clauses, which omit the word “all,”
Hamburger states that “when granting legislative power, the
Constitution speaks of all legislative powers.”119 The President
can “delegate some executive power to his subordinates,”
Hamburger argues, because the Constitution does not vest all
legislative power to the President, but “Congress cannot delegate
any of its legislative powers, for they all rest in Congress.”120
Hamburger’s vesting argument is an influential one, since,
as he notes, Justice Gorsuch employed a vesting argument in
Gundy v. United States, and also cites to Hamburger’s work on
nondelegation in his dissent.121 Few would claim that Congress
cannot leave even the slightest detail to federal agencies to fill in.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.”).
117 Philip Hamburger, Delegating or Divesting?, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 88, 110 (2020)
(“First, because the Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, Congress cannot
vest any such powers elsewhere. Second, Congress cannot divest itself of the powers that
the Constitution vests in it.”). Hamburger notes, however, that a “full exposition of these
points must await another publication. Id.
118 Id. at 88 (italics in original).
119 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 387 (2014).
120 Id.
121 See 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135, 2140 n.62 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Accepting,
then, that we have an obligation to decide whether Congress has unconstitutionally
divested itself of its legislative responsibilities, the question follows: What's the test?”).
115
116
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However, Congress can legislate with incredible detail and, in
the early days of the Republic, frequently did.122 Hamburger’s
argument would mandate that because Congress can legislate
with great detail, only it can specify such details, which would
turn legislative acts into unworkable monstrosities. Such a bar
would rob Congress of the power to employ the discretion and
flexibility of federal agencies when Congress thought it necessary
or desirable and would make government far less efficient.
Those asserting that the nondelegation doctrine can be found
in the Vesting Clauses, however, should wrestle with the original
meaning of the word “vest” in the Constitution and whether
vesting legislative powers in Congress precludes or limits
delegating those powers. Richard Epstein is rare among
originalists discussing nondelegation in attempting to tease out
the original meaning of the word “vest” in the Vesting Clauses,
and his discussion shows the difficulty in finding a delegation bar
in Article I’s vesting of all legislative power in Congress. Epstein
states, “The use of the term ‘vested’ brings back images of vested
rights in the law of property; that is, rights that are fully clothed
and protected, which means, at the very least, that they cannot
be undone by ordinary legislative action. . .”123 From this, Epstein
derives the conclusion that legislative power cannot be delegated
to an agency or other branch of government or otherwise.124
A property analogy for the Vesting Clauses weighs against
the existence of a nondelegation doctrine, however, since some
property interests may at times become transferable and sold
only when they become vested and not before. For example,
interests in a will may become transferable when they are
vested, though they may not be when merely contingent.125 If the
vesting of legislative power may be analogized to the vesting of
property rights, it seems that, while Congress should not be able

122 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1292 (2006) (“Early Congresses also
micromanaged administration . . . in excruciating detail. The 1791 statute . . . laying taxes
on distilled spirits, occupies fifteen pages in the Statutes at Large and specifies everything
from the brand of hydrometer to be used in testing proof, to the exact lettering to be used
on casks that have been inspected, to the wording of signs to be used to identify revenue
offices.”).
123 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE DUBIOUS MORALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 36 (2020).
124 Id.
125 See Real Property—Vested Remainders—Validity of Assignment, 30 YALE L.J. 100,
100 (1920) (discussing that in deciding whether a property interest in an estate may be
transferred, “the court avoided the necessity of determining the transferability of
contingent remainders and followed the well-settled rule, to which judicial history of that
very jurisdiction has long contributed, that vested remainders are fully transmissible as
other species of property” (citing In Re Whitney’s Estate, 176 Cal. 12 (1917))).
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to transfer its legislative powers wholesale, it should be free to
delegate their use to the Executive Branch, like a property owner
vested with title may lend the use of that property to another.
Another common claim for the source of the nondelegation
doctrine is that it stems from the separation of powers, itself also
not directly stated in the Constitution.126 However, the
separation of powers by itself would seem to justify some
legislative delegation, not forbid it. As Justice Scalia noted in
Mistretta v. United States, absolute separation of power is
impossible, and “a certain degree of discretion, and thus of
lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action,” and
therefore it is up to Congress “to determine-up to a point-how
small or how large that degree shall be.”127
Gary Lawson argues that the absence in the Constitution of
text allowing delegation shows that delegation of legislative
power is forbidden. To Lawson, the correct question is, “Does any
clause of the Constitution expressly or implicitly permit the
delegation of legislative authority?”128 Because the Constitution
creates a “government of limited and enumerated powers,”
Lawson states that any claim that a branch of that government
can do something must be based on an enumerated power to do
so. While legislative power is vested in Congress, his argument
goes: Congress can do nothing with that power not explicitly
permitted elsewhere in the Constitution, and because delegation
is not mentioned, it is barred.129 This argument, however, seems
to fly in the face of Article I, Section 9’s list of specific powers
denied Congress. If Congress has only those powers expressly
granted to it, there would be no need for a list of powers denied
Congress. From the division of power in the Vesting Clauses,
Lawson asserts there must be a baseline, a line past which the
various branches cannot otherwise intrude into powers granted
other branches. “The Vesting Clauses, and indeed the entire
structure of the Constitution, make no sense otherwise.”130 To
buttress this argument, Lawson cites to Madison and the

126 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“The nondelegation
doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite
system of Government . . .” (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892))).
127 Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128 See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 337 (2002).
129 Id. Douglas Ginsburg made a similar argument, asserting “Nor can the Congress
confer such a lawmaking power by statute, for the simple reason that the Congress has no
enumerated power to create lawmakers.” Douglas Ginsburg, Legislative Powers: Not
Yours to Give Away, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 6, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/theconstitution/report/legislative-powers-not-yours-give-away [http://perma.cc/5VCE-TPFR].
130 Lawson, supra note 128, at 340.
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Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, but acknowledges in a
footnote that the historical sources are not conclusive evidence.131
C. Locke as the Source for the Nondelegation Doctrine
Defenders of the nondelegation doctrine often credit John
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government as one of the primary
sources for the that doctrine.132 In his Second Treatise of
Government, Locke stated as a constraint on legislative power
that it, being derived from “the People by a positive voluntary
Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what that positive
Grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to
make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer
their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands.”133
Some originalist scholars and judges treat Locke’s statement
as if it were incorporated implicitly into the Constitution. Aaron
Gordon stated, “Locke’s ideas profoundly influenced the
development of America’s Constitution, and there is substantial
evidence that his disapproval of legislative delegation in
particular was incorporated into our founding document . . .”134
Ilan Wurman boldly states, “The nondelegation principle can be
traced to John Locke’s Second Treatise, which was deeply
influential on the Founding generation.”135 Justice Gorsuch’s
Gundy dissent echoed that claim, stating without any citation of
authority and, given the historical record, in all likelihood
erroneously that Locke was “one of the thinkers who most
influenced the Framers’ understanding of the separation of
powers.”136 Justice Rehnquist cited Locke for the proposition that
“the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of
making laws and place it in other hands.”137 Justice Thomas cited
Locke for the same proposition, and contended that Locke’s and
others’ writing “about the relationship between private rights

Id. at 341 n.51.
Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's
Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1311 (2003).
133 LOCKE, supra note 5, at 363 (emphasis omitted).
134 Gordon, supra note 43, at 739.
135 Wurman, supra note 66, at 29.
136 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
137 Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672–73 (1980) (“In his
Second Treatise of Civil Government, published in 1690, John Locke wrote that ‘[t]he
power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and
institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to
make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their
authority of making laws and place it in other hands.’”).
131
132
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and governmental power profoundly influenced the men who
crafted, debated, and ratified the Constitution.”138
The supposed influence of Locke’s Second Treatise over the
drafters of the Constitution is thus central to originalists’ claim
that the Constitution contains an implicit nondelegation
doctrine. Thomas Merrill noted, “The premise here is that the
Framers were familiar with and largely approved of Locke’s
political philosophy. So if Locke supported the legislative
monopoly position, the Framers presumably supported the
legislative
monopoly
position.”139
This
unwarranted
overemphasis of Locke’s influence is not limited to the
nondelegation doctrine but rather is endemic among some
“[t]heorists . . . committed to at least one version of foundational
rights, [who] claim to look at the American past but see little
more than John Locke.”140
Claims that Locke’s nondelegation proposition or even
Locke’s writings generally were a central influence on the
drafting of the Constitution appear to be false. Instead, the
historical record indicates, as will be discussed, that: (1) Locke’s
nondelegation argument appears little mentioned in America in
the years leading up to the Constitution’s drafting; (2) limitations
on delegation in general seem little discussed during the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution; (3) Locke’s primary influence
in the colonies was in the justification of revolution and among
the clergy, who were drawn to Locke’s religious preoccupations;
(4) by the time the Constitution was drafted, the evidence
indicates that Locke’s influence on politics had already declined
dramatically in America; (5) in the 1780s, Locke was cited at
times by the Anti-Federalists, but rarely if ever by the
Federalists; and (6) Madison voiced wariness of Locke as a guide
to separation of powers issues and, in his most extended
discussion of the delegation of powers, Madison did not even
mention Locke, but instead cited Montesquieu as “the great
oracle.” 141
Nondelegation advocates have turned up almost no evidence
that Locke had any influence regarding nondelegation in the
years immediately before the Ratification. Nicholas Parrillo notes
that “the secondary literature turns up only one instance of an
Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 72–74 (2015).
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2132 (2004).
140 Martin Flaherty, History ‘Lite’ in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 523, 528 (1995).
141 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1.
138
139
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American from 1765 through 1788 citing this point from Locke,
in an anonymous newspaper essay” in discussing the states
delegating their legislative powers to the Continental Congress,
which is a very different subject.142
Locke may have been influential in America before the
Revolution started, but not afterwards, and his influence mostly
came from his other writings, not from the Second Treatise relied
on by supporters of the nondelegation doctrine. Few copies of
Locke’s Two Treatises reached the colonies before 1724, and those
known copies that initially arrived in the northern colonies were
typically part of the Collected Works of John Locke, “three clumsy
and faintly forbidding folio volumes.143 Only one edition of
Locke’s Two Treatises was published during the colonial period in
America, in 1773, and it was not printed again in America for
164 years.144 As John Dunn stated, “The story of how the Two
Treatises of Government was causally responsible (for what other
sorts of responsibility could it bear?) for the direction of American
political theory in the eighteenth century is, of course, largely
false.”145 Pocock states that this era of Revolution and the slow
emergence of republics occurred in “an intellectual scene
dominated to the point of obsessiveness by concepts of virtue,
patriotism, and corruption, in whose making and transmission
Locke played little part”146 Steven Dworetz recounts how an
earlier generation of scholars wildly overestimated Locke’s
influence in America and that later scholars responded by
underestimating Locke’s influence in the colonies as they
considered rebellion.147 Dworetz demonstrates the influence of
Locke’s Second Treatise by showing that twenty-five lines from it
were quoted, word for word, by the “Jerseymen,” a well-armed
movement fighting over land rights in the late 1740s.148
142 Nicholas R. Parrillo, Supplemental Paper to: A Critical Assessment of the
Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the
Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, at 6 n.11 (C. Boyden Gray Ctr. for the
Study
of
the
Admin.
State,
Working
Paper
No.
20-17,
2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3696902.
143 John Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth
Century, in POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
THEORY 70 (1980).
144 FORREST MCDONALD, NOVOUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 66 (1985).
145 JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE ‘TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT’ 7 (1969).
146 J.G.A Pocock, Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century, 3 J. INTERDISC.
HIST. 119, 127 (1972).
147 STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 13–27 (1990).
148 Id. at 74.
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Dworetz is careful to note, however, the sudden and drastic
decline in Locke’s influence in the colonies once war started and
as the colonists started turning their thoughts to “disquisitions
on the design of governments and constitutions. This transition
from the Revolutionary to the Constitutional era seems to have
occurred around 1776; and, significantly, it coincided with, and
was reflected in, a dramatic decline in Locke’s ‘rate of
citation.’”149 The Framers apparently did not consider Locke a
useful guide in how to design their new government.
Noted historians Oscar Handlin and Lillian Handlin perhaps
somewhat overstated the case when they claimed that “a careful
reading of the Two Treatises leads to the inescapable conclusion
that it was not likely that any among the Founding Fathers had
read this bedrock of American political theory” but appear
completely accurate when they stated that “his reputation in the
colonies rested not on the treatises on government,” but rather on
his work on epistemology and education.150 They added, perhaps
missing a few counterexamples: “Locke wrote at length [in the
Second Treatise] about two subjects that should have concerned
Americans; yet as far as the record shows, his views never
became subjects for conversation in the lanes of Boston or
Philadelphia, or even grist for debaters, pamphleteers, and
journalists.”151
As Gary Rosen stated, “Locke was most cited during the
struggle for independence, when basic matters of political right
were at issue,” but founders turned to other philosophers “when
institutions were a primary concern.”152 Locke was a large
influence among the clergy in the colonies, who shared his
religious preoccupations and embraced his justification for
revolution.153 James Otis, one of the few colonists who publicly
mentioned Locke’s views on nondelegation,154 was a link between

Id. at 44.
Oscar Handlin & Lilian Handlin, Who Read John Locke? Words and Acts in the
American Revolution, 58 AM. SCHOLAR 546, 547 (1989).
151 Id. at 548.
152 GARY ROSEN, AMERICAN COMPACT: JAMES MADISON AND THE PROBLEM OF
FOUNDING 205 n.40 (1999) (citing Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European
Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
189, 192 (1984)).
153 DWORETZ, supra note 147, at 32. “From the perspective of eighteenth-century
colonists, the theistic Locke was most likely to have been the Locke. . . This is especially
so with the New England clergy, [who] were demonstrably conversant with Locke’s
writings, and they had similar “religious preoccupations. They openly embraced Locke’s
political ideas—for example, the justification for revolution. . .” Id. (emphasis in original).
154 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 184–88.
149
150
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the clergy and revolutionary ferment.155 In the 1760s, Locke was
cited on politics primarily about the relationship between Britain
and the American colonists, and in the 1770s to justify breaking
with England and writing new constitutions.156 Locke’s influence
in America seems to have dropped dramatically after the start of
the Revolutionary War and he was rarely cited after 1781.157 One
study of American resistance pamphlets indicates that citations
of Locke dropped off once the fighting started and that “after the
fighting began in 1775, the revolutionary writers began to change
their focus away from resistance theory, and direct invocation of
Locke became more rare.”158
Locke had little influence in the drafting of the Constitution
and more influence among those who opposed the final
document. Locke had “relatively little to say about specific
institutions.”159 and so it is “not surprising that his influence
was . . . very indirect on those writing the Constitution.”160
Locke’s Second Treatise ends with a chapter entitled “Of the
Dissolution of Government” and, as Forrest McDonald notes, “As
to what legitimately follows the dissolution of government,
however, the chapter is ambiguous.”161
Locke was rarely publicly cited by the Federalists during the
1780s, at least in ways that show up in the historical record.162
During the 1780s, Locke was cited more often, however, by the
Anti-Federalists, so his influence during the drafting period
seems to have been primarily with those opposing the
Constitution as drafted.163 Anti-Federalists were drawn to
Locke’s natural-rights individualism.164

155 DWORETZ, supra note 147, at 54 (“Otis, to be sure, was not a man of the cloth. But
he did have close ties to some radical and influential ministers—close enough for one
prominent Tory to identify him as the driving force behind the notorious ‘Black Regiment’
of seditious preachers.”).
156 DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 143 (1988).
157 Donald S. Lutz, The Intellectual Background to the American Founding, 21 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 2327, 2336 (1990).
158 Alex Tuckness, Discourses of Resistance in the American Revolution, 64 J. HIST.
IDEAS 547, 550 (2003).
159 Lutz, supra note 157, at 144. See also John Dunn, Consent in the Political Theory
of John Locke, 10 HIST. J. 153, 153–54 (1967).
160 LUTZ, supra note 156, at 2347. See also Flaherty, supra note 140, at 546 (“[T]he
constitution the Americans advanced was fully consistent with Locke, and at times
augmented with Lockean references, though . . . it owed little to the philosopher
directly.”).
161 MCDONALD, supra note 144, at 145.
162 LUTZ, supra note 156, at 145.
163 Id.
164 Daniel Walker Howe, Introduction: Anti-Federalist/Federalist Dialogue and Its
Implications for Constitutional Understanding, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
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Merle Curti, a great defender of Locke’s influence in America,
stated “Treatises of Civil Government was seldom cited in the
Constitutional Convention of 1787. . .” 165 and Curti gives as an
example of such rare citation a statement by an Anti-Federalist who
later walked out of Convention without signing the Constitution.166
Even Jerome Huyler, in a book chapter attempting to prove Locke’s
influence on the drafting of the Constitution, comes up mostly dry.
Huyler points only to Locke’s influence on such general topics as the
sanctity of property, the importance of enlightened reason, and
equal protection.167 Even when Huyler points out someone in the
Founding Era who was influenced by Locke, it was Samuel Adams,
then an Anti-Federalist, who “frequently” quoted Locke
“verbatim.”168
Donald Lutz, in a noted study of citations during the
Founding Era, found that the observable influence of
Montesquieu soared while Locke’s plummeted during the
drafting of the Constitution and of state constitutions.169 Lutz
concluded, “Locke’s influence [in the design of the Constitution or
state constitutions] has been exaggerated . . . and finding him
hidden in passages of the U.S. Constitution is an exercise that
requires more evidence than has hitherto ever been provided.”170
Madison himself seemed wary of trusting Locke on separation
of powers issues, given how long-ago Locke had written and that
Locke was writing about monarchical British government with a
Parliament that ill represented the people. Writing as “Helvidius”
in a 1793 newspaper debate with Alexander Hamilton, Madison
argued that for separation of powers issues, “our own reason and
our own constitution, are the best guides” since “a just analysis” of
“the powers of government, according to their executive, legislative
and judiciary qualities are not to be expected in the works of the
most received jurists, who wrote before a critical attention was paid
165 Merle Curti, The Great Mr. Locke: America's Philosopher, 1783–1861, 11
HUNTINGTON LIB. BULL. 107, 135 (1937) (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 437 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
166 Id. at 135 n.1 (“Luther Martin cited Locke to prove that individuals, under
primitive conditions, are equally free and independent, and that the case was the same
with states until they surrendered their equal authority.”). “A strong anti-Federalist
opposed to the plan for a strong central government, Martin displayed his disapproval of
what the Convention produced by walking out without signing the Constitution.” Luther
Martin, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/LutherMartin [http://perma.cc/X5PN-JD5G] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021).
167 JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOUNDING
ERA 251–73 (1995).
168 Id. at 266.
169 Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late EighteenthCentury American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 192 (1984).
170 Id. at 192–93.
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to those objects, and with their eyes too much on monarchical
governments.”171 Madison seemed to recognize that with a
democratically elected president, the Founders would be creating a
very different government than Locke’s England, so they should not
trust Locke’s analysis.
Madison added that Locke and Montesquieu “are evidently
warped by a regard to the particular government of England, to
which one of them owed allegiance; and the other professed an
admiration bordering on idolatry.”172 Madison clearly distrusted
Locke’s teachings about how governments should be structured,
given Locke’s “warped” regard. Locke’s paltry influence during the
drafting of the Constitution, almost all with the Anti-Federalists,
should not be allowed magically to insert a nondelegation doctrine
into the Constitution and hence overrule the decisions of the
Framers and the First Congress. reject. For the Court to adopt a
robust nondelegation doctrine absent in the Constitution and
based on Locke’s outdated dictum would be akin to the Court
siding with the Anti-Federalists and their allegiance to Locke in
rejecting the Framers’ decisions.
As evidence of Locke’s purported deep influence on the
drafting of the Constitution, Wurman cites a book by Bernard
Bailyn on the ideological foundations of the American
Revolution,173 not on the drafting of the Constitution, two
fundamentally different eras and enterprises and influences in
one might have nothing to do with the other. Bailyn’s book
indicates that Locke was cited before the Revolutionary War on
justifications for revolt, such as natural rights and the “social
and governmental contract,” but nowhere indicates that Locke
was a significant influence in the drafting of the Constitution.174
Bailyn instead notes that it was writers like “Grotius, Pufendorf,
Burlamaqui, and Vattel” who were cited “on the principles of civil
government.”175 As noted by Steven Dworetz, Bailyn’s book
171 “Helvidius” Number 1, [24 August] 1793, FOUNDERS ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-15-02-0056
[http://perma.cc/X66LU6KY] (citing 15 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 66–74 (Thomas A.
Mason et al. eds., 1985)).
172 Id.
173 Wurman, supra note 66, at 29 n.146 (citing BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27–30 (1992)).
174 Id. at 27.
175 Id. (“In pamphlet after pamphlet the American writers cited Locke on natural
rights and on the social and governmental contract, Montesquieu and later Delolme on
the character of British liberty and on the institutional requirements for its attainment,
Voltaire on the evils of clerical oppression, Beccaria on the reform of criminal law,
Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel on the laws of nature and of nations, and on
the principles of civil government.”).
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argues “that the politics and political thought of the American
Revolution had been decisively conditioned and constrained by
an essentially non-Lockean ideological tradition.”176
Wurman then cites to a book by Alan Gibson that argues
that “the Lockean variation of the principles of classical
liberalism” is at “the core of the Founders’ political thought,” but
this tells us nothing about Locke’s Second Treatise or
nondelegation.177 Moreover, Gibson’s new edition of this book
states that the work of noted historian J.G.A. Pocock “has led
scholars to direct attention away from the influence of the
political thought of John Locke in the eighteenth century and
particularly in the American Founding.”178 Gibson also discusses
how American colonists in the 1780s turned away from the
radical Whiggism exemplified by Locke to “profoundly reconsider
the set of assumptions that they held about republican
government.”.179 This provides yet another explanation for the
precipitous decline of Locke’s influence in America when the
Revolution started. Wurman’s last basis for his foundational
claim regarding Locke’s influence on the Constitution is a law
review article by Jack Rakove, which states the Founders were
“eclectically conversant with the works of luminaries like
Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, and Blackstone” in a long
list of similar influences, including among many others
“European authorities as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Delolme” and
“the legacy of Newtonian science. . .”180 Rakove’s long list hardly
gives Locke’s influence primacy of place in influencing the
drafting of the Constitution in general, let alone delegation in
particular.
Aaron Gordon claims that “Locke’s condemnation of
legislative delegation was frequently cited by statesmen and
commentators in late-Eighteenth and early-Nineteenth Century
America. . .”, but his only sources from the Founding name Locke
for this point appear to be a 1763 political pamphlet by James Otis
discussing Locke’s argument and an 1818 John Adams letter in

DWORETZ, supra note 147, at 17–18.
Wurman, supra note 66, at 29 n.146 (quoting ALAN GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE
FOUNDING: GUIDE TO THE ENDURING DEBATES OVER THE ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 13–21 (2006)).
178 Id. at 35. For an extended discussion of whether the Founding Generation adopted
Lockean ideals, see supra pp. 13–18.
179 Id. at 47 (describing the disagreement between Wills and Jayne).
180 Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity through History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587,
1598 (1997). Rakove helpfully provides a list of historians to consult on the influences on
late eighteenth-century political thinking in America, including the above-mentioned
Bernard Bailyn, John Dunn, “and, of course, J.G.A. Pocock . . .” Id. at 1598 n.32.
176
177
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which Adams, then in his 80s, in tracing the sources of the
Revolution, copied part of the Otis pamphlet from more than a
half-century earlier.181 That Gordon’s only apparent evidence
naming Locke is the text of the same pamphlet in two different
forms, one from the pre-Revolutionary era and the other from
more than thirty years after the drafting, indicates how very little
influence Locke had on the drafting of the Constitution, especially
given Gordon’s obviously meticulous research to dig up even the
slightest shred of evidence of nondelegation at the Founding.
Moreover, the Otis pamphlet cited by Gordon actually
undercuts his nondelegation argument, since it constitutes the
argument that Parliament can delegate legislative power to
subordinate legislatures, and that the legislatures of the colonies
should not be easily stripped of their legislative powers,
subordinate though they were, because of the natural and
equitable rights of the colonists.182 Otis stated: “The supreme
national legislative cannot be altered justly ‘till the
commonwealth is dissolved, nor a subordinate legislative taken
away without forfeiture or other good cause.”183 Otis argued that
Locke’s assertion that a legislature’s “whole power is not
transferable” should not prevent the recognition of colonial
legislatures.184 Doing so would not transfer the whole power of
Parliament but rather a limited power to legislate on subjects
pertinent to the colonies. In doing so, Otis was not following
Locke’s dictum against delegation designed to protect
Parliament’s power from the King, but rather completely
changing it. Otis took Locke’s principles, “which were designed
originally to support claims to parliamentary supremacy in late
seventeenth-century England, and refashioned these principles
to provide theoretical justification for the legitimacy of colonial
assemblies as autonomous institutions” despite Parliament’s
supremacy.”185 Otis was not citing Locke to condemn legislative
delegation but rather to request it for the colonies.
181 Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation Misinformation: A Rebuttal To “Delegation At The
Founding” And Its Progeny (April 30, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561062
(manuscript at 19 n.114) (citing JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES
ASSERTED AND PROVED (1763) and Letter to William Wirt (Mar. 7, 1818), in WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 293 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1856)).
182 JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (1763)
(“[C]olonists will have an equitable right notwithstanding any such forfeiture of charter,
to be represented in Parliament, or to have some new subordinate legislature among
themselves. It would be best if they had both.”).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Lee Ward, James Otis and the Americanization of John Locke, 4 AM. POL.
THOUGHT 181, 182 (2015).
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Gordon also relies for nondelegation at the Founding on an
1818 letter from John Adams, which Gordon claims “likewise
expressed agreement with Locke’s disapproval of legislative
delegation.”186 However, the text is evidence that Locke was
influential before the Revolution, but that his influence declined
dramatically thereafter. In the letter, Adams described the Otis
pamphlet as one of the influences of the Revolution and
something he had been very familiar with back then but it
appears he had not seen it since.187 That Gordon refers to the
same pamphlet in two different forms, the pamphlet itself
decades before the ratification of the Constitution and a copying
out of some of the pamphlet decades after, undermines his claim
that Locke’s condemnation of delegation was much discussed at
the Founding.
Gordon also claims as evidence instances where colonists
complained about Parliament’s delegation of power to the King,
including a 1774 tract by Thomas Jefferson objecting to
delegation of power in England to the King188 However, in his
other examples, he does not state that Locke was even
mentioned, which indicates Locke’s waning influence in the
colonies. Also, Parliament as representative of the people
(however poorly) delegating to a royal monarch is very different
than Congress delegating to an elected President, so criticizing
Parliament’s delegation of power to a monarch does not show
how Americans would feel about Congress delegating to a
democratically elected president.
Locke recognized the necessity of delegating legislative
power and allowed that the Executive would share some
legislative power. Lee Ward noted that Locke’s theory of
delegated powers is “sufficiently comprehensive to provide for the
establishment of a system of laws that would provide
independent constitutional authority for both the supreme
legislative power and a supreme Executive power that holds
some share of the legislative power.”189 Merrill asserted that
Locke himself seems to have thought that Parliament could
Gordon, supra note 43, at 740–41.
From John Adams to William Wirt, 7 March 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE: NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6863
[http://perma.cc/BQ2A-TVBX]
(citing JOHN ADAMS, THE ADAMS PAPERS (early access document to forthcoming final
authoritative
source),
https://founders.archives.gov/content/volumes#Adams
[http://perma.cc/72BE-7RZA]).
188 Gordon, supra note 43, at 741 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF
THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774), in 1 MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 112–13 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829)).
189 Ward, supra note 185, at 193.
186
187
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delegate legislative power to the King under certain
circumstances and that Locke “believed the executive had
inherent authority to act with the force of law, subject to being
overridden by subsequent action of the legislature.”190 Merrill
also showed that Locke may have allowed for delegation of
legislative power where the supreme legislative body had given
its sanction. Locke asserted that no edict of any other entity can
have “have the force and obligation of a Law, which has not its
Sanction from that Legislative, which the publick has chosen and
appointed.”191 Merrill notes that this could mean that “the
legislature does have the power to confer authority on other
persons to act with the force of law, provided it gives its ‘sanction’
to this outcome. . .”192
Locke’s position restricting legislative delegation was far
from universal, even in England in his day. Philip Hamburger
noted that Locke’s position was one that “Englishmen of
whiggish views tended to argue. . .”193 Hamburger further
describes how the Whigs themselves arguably violated the
principle described by Locke by passing the Septennial Act,
which replaced triennial elections with elections every seven
years, against the objection of the Tories.194 “Taking up whiggish
arguments, Tories complained that Parliament had reconveyed
its power.”195 According to Hamburger, neither political party in
England had so fixed a position on delegation that they were
“unwilling to shift gears when it suited them.”196
It is important to note that the Framers rejected England’s
form of government and constructed a system of government far
different from that of Locke’s England. In Britain in the 1680s,
legislative power was held by a combination of the King, Lords,
and Commons, while the “king alone was supreme in the
monarchical functions.”197 While Parliament was hardly a
completely democratic institution, the monarchy was not at all
democratic. Locke’s views on delegation is an aspect of the fact
that “the deep structure of Locke’s account of politics is
190 Merrill, supra note 139, at 2133 (“The principal complication is that Locke in fact
was not opposed to all sharing of legislative power in the functional sense, because he
endorsed the concept of the executive prerogative.”).
191 Id. at 2134 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 356
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)).
192 Id.
193 HAMBURGER, supra note 119, at 381.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 382.
196 Hamburger, supra note 117, at 97.
197 Suri Ratnapala, John Locke's Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A ReEvaluation, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 218 (1993).
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profoundly democratic.”198 And so it makes sense that Locke
would in general condemn delegation of legislative power from an
at least partially representative Parliament to an unelected
monarch.199 However, the Framers might not have thought that
such condemnation would apply to America’s Congress
delegating to the Executive Branch. Further, the delegation
notorious in Locke’s day was “The Statute of Proclamations”,
passed to give legislative authority to proclamations of Henry
VIII in 1539. This delegation was completely unlike Congress’s
delegation to federal agencies today, in that it gave Henry VIII as
king-in-council power to create law on almost any topic,
unconnected from the policy dictated by or the direction of
Parliament, and with few limitations.
Defenders of the nondelegation doctrine have argued that it
is foundational.200 However, nondelegation was not a significant
issue in the drafting or ratification of the Constitution. Nicholas
Parrillo, after an exhaustive search, stated, “Legislative
delegation was not an object of sustained constitutional
discussion.”201 The few references he did find give little indication
of the contours of any proposed bar on delegation, Parrillo notes,
“because the references that speak to such issues appear to have
been rejected by majorities of their audiences, or involved types
of delegations categorically different from those that Congress
makes to an agency.”202 Posner and Vermeule combed the
ratification debates for discussion of delegation and found
“nothing of any real relevance.”203 If the nondelegation doctrine
were a foundational element of the Constitution as some claim,
surely more than just a passing mention of nondelegation would
appear somewhere in the vast records of the multitude of debates
at the Convention and during ratification, many about
constitutional meaning. However, as Mortenson and Bagley
assert, “there is trifling evidence of a nondelegation doctrine even
being argued for by aggressive legal innovators, let alone broadly
accepted by the Founders as a group.”204
198 Ian Shapiro, John Locke's Democratic Theory, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND
A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 309, 310 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003).

Ward, supra note 185, at 193.
Redish, supra note 15, at 366 (“Without enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, the
foundational precepts of the American system of government are seriously undermined.”).
201 Parrillo, supra note 142 (manuscript at 7 n.12).
202 Id. at 8.
203 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1734 (“A search for references to delegation
in the ratification debates of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York,
Pennsylvania (including the Harrisburg Proceedings), Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, and South Carolina turned up nothing relevant.”).
204 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 293.
199
200
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Another theory argues that nondelegation is an essential
part of agency theory, and that as an agent of the public,
Congress is prohibited from delegating the powers granted to it.
This is supposedly derived from the common law maxim delegata
potestas non potest delegari—one with delegated authority lacks
the power to delegated it further.205 Sotirios Barber noted that
this maxim is primarily seen in the common law of agency,
though has been applied as a rule of constitutional law, and
argues that both may be mere applications of “the general
principle of nondelegation which attaches to any delegated
power” without expressed contrary provisions.206 Where this
general principle resides, Barber does not say.
The Delegata maxim and the associated agency doctrine seem
to be a post hoc explanation justifying the nondelegation doctrine,
not an influence on the Framers. The Delegata maxim does not
appear much discussed in the Founding Era and neither it nor any
variant appears in the “tens of thousands of pages of searchable
archival material from the Continental Congress, from the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution, and from the records of the first
ten years of Congress . . .”207 and did not show up in any form in the
United States federal and state case reports until 1794.208
Mortenson and Bagley note a fundamental flaw in the proposition
that agency rules govern constitutional meaning: those making that
proposal “cannot point to any evidence that the private law agency
analogy should govern constitutional interpretation.”209
More importantly, it appears that the Delegata maxim, as
understood in the Founding Era, would permit the delegation of the
power to do specific acts, and only bar the transfer of the whole
powers of a governmental officer or entity. For example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case Respublica v. Duquet
upheld the delegation of legislative power by the state to the City of
Philadelphia, and in the 1809 case Hunt v. Burrel, the court held
that an undersheriff could validly delegate the power to execute a
writ.210 The court held that the Delegata maxim is correct “when

205 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary
Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 254 (2010) (stating “Locke developed the
nondelegation doctrine out of an elementary maxim of the law of agency, delegata potestas
non potest delegari—delegated powers cannot be further delegated.”).
206 SOTIRIOS
A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER 26–27 (1975).
207 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 297.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799); Hunt v. Burrel, 5 Johns. 137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1809).
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duly applied; for to make a deputy by a deputy, in the sense of
the maxim, implies an assignment of the whole power, which a
deputy cannot make. A deputy has general powers, which he
cannot transfer; but he may constitute a servant, or bailiff, to do
a particular act.”211
In other words, as understood in the early years of the
Republic, the Delegata maxim would not prohibit Congress from
a limited delegation of its legislative power to a federal agency,
but rather would only bar a delegation of its whole legislative
power to another entity.
The Delegata maxim has many exceptions that “give away
the game,” in the words of Posner and Vermeule.212 They cite the
exceptions listed by Justice Story, an early explicator of that
maxim: from the express language, or from fair presumptions,
from the particular transaction, or through the usage of trade.213
If Congress’s legislation must be built on explicitly enumerated
powers, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, they argue
that “[n]ondelegation proponents must explain why those
enumerated powers don’t represent just the sort of provision
that, in Story’s framework, create a ‘fair presumption’ that the
delegate may redelegate its powers as necessary or
appropriate.”214
Justice Story explained the bar on an agent delegating her
powers in his Commentaries on the Law of Agency. “One, who has
a bare power or authority from another to do an act, must
execute it himself, and cannot delegate his authority to another;
for this being a trust or confidence reposed in him personally, it
cannot be assigned to a stranger . . .”215 Justice Story himself,
though, notes the limits of the Delegata maxim, stating that
“there are cases, in which the authority may be implied; as where
it is indispensable by the laws, in order to accomplish the end; or
it is the ordinary custom of trade; or it is understood by the
parties to be the mode, in which the particular business would or
might be done . . .”216 Duff and Whiteside tartly note, “In other
Id.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1733.
Id. (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 14–15
(Charles P. Greenough ed., Little, Brown & Co. 9th ed. rev. 1882)).
214 Id.
215 Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A
Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 168 (1929) (quoting
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 13 (C.C. Little & J. Brown 2nd
ed. rev. 1839)).
216 Id. at 169 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 14
(C.C. Little & J. Brown 2nd ed. rev. 1839)).
211
212
213
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words, delegated authority cannot be re-delegated unless there is
some reason why it should be.”217 Even under agency law at the
time the Constitution was drafted, then, Congress could have
delegated its legislative power in order to accomplish the
purposes of legislation. Also, delegation by Congress has been the
norm since the Founding,218 so it is clearly customary by now and
understood as a significant part of how government functions.
Furthermore, the Delegata maxim itself seems to have arisen
originally from a printer’s error. In 1929, Duff and Whiteside
conducted an extensive search for the origins of the Delegata
doctrine, tracing it back from its use by American and English
sources and to a misprinted Medieval document. They concluded
that instead of asserting that delegated power cannot be itself
delegated, the original meaning was that the power of the King
cannot “be so delegated, that the primary (or regulating) power
does not remain with the King himself” and so the Delegata
doctrine owes “its vogue in the common law to the carelessness of
a sixteenth century printer.”219 Under the doctrine’s original
meaning, Congress would be permitted to delegate legislative
power to federal agencies so long as it retains the primary and
regulating power to legislate itself, something that would
virtually always be true in a system where Congress’s laws take
precedence over federal agencies’ regulations.
D. The Nondelegation Doctrine’s Brief Life and Long Dormancy
in the Supreme Court
As has been often noted, the Supreme Court’s history of
applying the nondelegation doctrine in any meaningful way
started well after the Founding and it did not invalidate
legislation based on that doctrine until 1935, and not after that
year. The first mention of the nondelegation doctrine, indirectly,
was in the Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, when the
Court did not respond directly to the nondelegation argument
and then in Wayman v. Southard in 1825, Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion seems to indicate that Congress cannot
delegate powers purely legislative except when it can, and the
line between important subjects which cannot be delegated and
other subjects which may be delegated is difficult to draw. 220
Id.
See generally Chabot, supra note 94.
Duff & Whiteside, supra note 215, at 173.
Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813). The
statute in question authorized the president to lift a statutory embargo if he determined
that the countries involved either had indicated respect for the commerce of the United
217
218
219
220
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In their extensive analysis of the history of the
nondelegation doctrine, Whittington and Iuliano noted, “[t]he
Court had remarkably little to say regarding the delegation of
legislative power from the late Marshall Court through the
remainder of the nineteenth century” and “avoided serious
engagement
with
the
principles
and
standards
of
nondelegation . . . .”221 It was not until the Field v. Clark222 in
1892 that the Court addressed nondelegation more directly.
There, the court considered a statute that delegated to the
President the ability to trigger higher tariff rates for countries
that failed to participate in reciprocal free trade. In response to
the argument that this inappropriately delegated legislative
powers to the President, the Court stated, “That Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”223
Still, the Court upheld the delegation in the statute at issue,
finding that it did not give the President legislative power.224
The Court followed that with a 1904 case concerning
whether Congress could delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury
authority to prevent adulterated tea from entering the American
market.225 The Court found that “Congress legislated on the
subject as far as was reasonably practicable” and that preventing
delegation of further discretionary decision-making denying to
Executive officials with discretionary power would in essence
declare “that the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate
foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted.”226 Hence,
the practical necessity of Congress delegating some decisions to
accomplish its goals justified the delegation. The Court further
justified delegation to an agency to fill in the details of a statute
in the Grimaud case in 1911, noting its use since the Founding,
States. The Supreme Court did not respond to this argument directly but merely noted,
“we can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in
reviving the [law allowing trade], either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment
should direct.” Id. at 388. In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43, 6 L. Ed. 253 (1825),
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion added little clarity on what legislative delegation is
permitted, stating, “[t]he line has not been exactly drawn which separates those
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those
of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who
are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.” Id.
221 Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 396 (2017).
222 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
223 Id. at 692.
224 Id.
225 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
226 Id. at 496.
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and that when Congress “indicated its will” with legislation, it
could delegate the “power to fill up the details” by the
establishment of administrative rules and regulations.227
The Court created a more explicit rule regarding what
delegation is permitted in the case J.W. Hampton, Jr. v. United
States, where it held that Congress could delegate so long as it lay
down an “intelligible principle” to guide the Executive Branch,
which would render it “the mere agent of the law-making
department . . . .”228 The “intelligible principle” rule remains the
primary standard by which courts determine whether delegation is
constitutionally permissible.229 The Court broadly approved
delegation for a period thereafter. “By the Progressive Era, the
Court was willing to characterize almost any action that a
government official performed as nonlegislative.”230
The Court approving every congressional delegation came to
a screeching, albeit brief, halt in 1935, in the cases Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan231 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation
v. United States,232 both concerning the National Industrial
Recovery Act (“NIRA”). In Panama Refining, the Court struck
down the delegation to the President of power to prohibit
transportation of petroleum and its products in excess of state
permission upon the Court’s finding that “Congress has declared
no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule.”233
In Schechter, the Court objected to legislation authorizing the
President to approve those “codes of fair competition”234 that
were submitted to him by trade associations regarding such
issues as labor practices and minimum wages.235 In his
concurring opinion to Schechter, Justice Cardozo stated, “[t]he
delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this
code is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
It is unconfined and vagrant . . . .”236

United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 521 (1911).
276 U.S. 394, 409, 411 (1928).
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1989) (listing the broad
delegations the Court has permitted).
230 Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 221, at 399.
231 293 U.S. at 388 (1935).
232 295 U.S. at 495 (1935).
233 293 U.S. at 430.
234 295 U.S. at 529.
235 295 U.S. at 541–42 (“In view of the scope of that broad declaration and of the
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in
approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and
industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”).
236 295 U.S. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
227
228
229

Do Not Delete

752

5/19/2021 12:57 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:3

These are “the only two cases in which the Supreme Court
has struck down a federal law for violating the nondelegation
doctrine.”237 The nondelegation doctrine has been virtually
dormant, at least at the Supreme Court level, since 1935, leading
to Cass Sunstein’s famous quip that the nondelegation doctrine
“has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”238
Since 1935, the Supreme Court has continued to worry over
the nondelegation doctrine, returning to it on occasion never to
revive it, but also never quite willing either to declare it defunct.
While it purports to enforce the requirement of an intelligible
principle to permit delegation, even when Congress’s direction to
the Executive Branch is less than intelligible, “the Court usually
merely interprets the authorizing statute to avoid the
difficulty.”239 In the recent case, Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, the Court continued to uphold the intelligible principle
test.240 There, Justice Scalia writing for a unanimous Court,
indicated that permitting delegation where there is an
“intelligible principle” limiting and guiding the exercise of
delegated power was, in the words of William K. Kelley, “both a
sound way to implement the Constitution and simultaneously
judicially unenforceable.”241
III. THE DEVOLUTION OF ORIGINALISM AND ITS GROWING ATTACK
ON REPRESENTATIONAL DEMOCRACY
A. Original Originalism
Despite its long dormancy and only one year of life, the
nondelegation doctrine has remained a constant topic among
legal scholars debating whether it still exists in any meaningful
way and why or why not. While some have proclaimed regularly
that the nondelegation doctrine is dead, opposing professors often
respond, in the words of Phillip Hamburger, “as if in a Monty
Python skit. ‘Not dead yet!’”242 Some originalist scholars and
others interested in curbing the power of the administrative state
have done their best to resuscitate the doctrine. Suzanna Sherry
asked, “[h]ow many ways can conservatives spin an originalist

See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 283–84.
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
HAMBURGER, supra note 119, at 378.
531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and Constitutional
Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2112 (2017).
242 HAMBURGER, supra note 119, at 378.
237
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tale to support their deregulatory, small-government vision? The
answer is apparently infinite.”243
That originalists would urge courts to be more active in
overturning Congress’s legislation and setting such basic policy
as the size of government and its regulation is a direct assault on
the foundations of originalism, in that originalism was originally
conceived as a justification for judicial restraint and as protection
for Congress’s legislative power from judicial activism.
Originalism was first designed to prevent “Government by
Judiciary,” the title of an enormously influential “originalism
manifesto,”244 but now some originalists want the courts to seize
the wheel of government and engage in judicial activism.245
Originalists first complained that activist judges were using their
judicial power to amend rather than interpret the Constitution,
but now some would have the Court create as a robust
constitutional mandate the nondelegation amendment that was
rejected for the Constitution.246 Explaining this sea change in the
nature and purpose of originalism requires a review of how
dramatically originalism has mutated since it was first
conceived.
Originalism as a movement began in the early 1970s among
conservatives fighting back against the liberal decisions of what
they viewed as an “activist” Warren Court. 247 While some earlier
court decisions had had an originalist bent, of course,248 judges
rarely did much historical research to determine the original
intent of the Framers or the original meaning of the

243

(2019).

Suzanna Sherry, The Imaginary Constitution, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 442

ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 60 (2018).
Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2005).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 40–47.
247 James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1335, 1347 (1997). James Fleming called originalism “a conservative ideology that
emerged in reaction against the Warren Court” but “did not exist” before that time.
248 For example, see Chief Justice Taney's words in Dred Scott:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in
relation to this unfortunate race, . . . should induce the court to give to the
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they
were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted.
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2009) (citing Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856) and these words as an example of
“strong originalism”). But see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 407
(2011) (“Taney's self-conscious embrace of originalism even when it leads to moral
depravity . . . was bad originalism. . . . These errors raise a suspicion that Taney's
aggressive positivism was but a façade for his abject racism.”).
244
245
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Constitution, and instead “cherry-picked evidence of original
meaning to suit their purposes.”249
The introduction of originalism is often credited to Robert
Bork, who as a law professor in 1971 published a law review
article that lamented how far he thought the Warren Court had
strayed from the Constitution’s text and original meaning.250
Bork declared that in cases of constitutional interpretation, “[t]he
judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair
implications, and not construct new rights.”251 Doing so protects
Congress and state legislatures and their setting of policy, Bork
argued, and he asserted that “courts must accept any value
choice the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a
choice made in the framing of the Constitution.”252 Bork’s view of
judicial restraint, that courts should accept legislation unless it is
clearly unconstitutional, is akin to, though weaker than, that of
Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer, who in an
influential 1893 law review article, urged that courts should
invalidate a statute only if its unconstitutionality is “so clear that
it is not open to rational question.”253
Though originalism has since evolved into a veritable
smorgasbord of conflicting approaches and interpretations, two
essential elements of most originalism approaches are the
following. First is the idea that the meaning of the Constitution
became fixed at its drafting or its ratification (or perhaps when
the meaning is liquidated through practice).254 The second
central pillar is the claim that the meaning of the Constitution
once fixed should be a restraint on its interpretation unless or
until the Constitution is amended.255
Originalism has been defended on both positive and normative
grounds. Among the positive grounds is the assertion that it

249 Jeremy Telman, Originalism as Fable (Reviewing Eric Segall, Originalism as
Faith), 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 748 (2018)).
250 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L. J. 1 (1971).
251 Id. at 8.
252 Id. at 10–11.
253 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). For a discussion of Thayer’s thesis, see Richard A.
Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519, 522 (2012).
254 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015) (“The meaning of the constitutional
text is fixed when each provision is framed and ratified: this claim can be called the
Fixation Thesis. This thesis is one of two core ideas of originalist constitutional theory:
the other is the Constraint Principle, which holds that the original meaning of the
constitutional text should constrain constitutional practice.”).
255 Id.
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provides the most accurate understanding of the meaning of the
Constitution.256 Among normative grounds is the claim that
jurisprudence based on originalism “facilitates the realization of a
political system grounded on popular sovereignty.”257 Keith
Whittington argued that originalism protects the effectiveness of
the popular will that created the Constitution and that judges who
fail to employ originalism could, through their rulings, set that will
aside.258 Randy Barnett argued that originalism best protects
substantive ideas of justice by protecting “background natural
rights retained by the people” as a “constitutional assumption that
is hard-wired into the meaning of the Constitution itself.”259
McGinnis and Rappaport argued that the Constitution should be
given its original meaning because only doing so will preserve the
beneficial effects of the supermajoritarian process of the
Constitution’s enactment and amendment, which affords “deep
deliberation” and creates “the consensus and nonpartisanship
necessary for fostering allegiance to a constitution that desirably
regulates politics and society.”260
The opposing view to originalism is living constitutionalism,
perhaps most broadly defined as “simply in opposition to
originalism.”261 Living constitutionalism is distinguished by
incorporating “contemporary values and attitudes into the
judicial ‘understanding’”262 of the Constitution, and treating it as
“an adaptive document that responds to changing social and
economic conditions through altered judicial interpretations of its
central textual provisions.”263 Originalism at first focused on the
intent of the drafters of the Constitution and so what has been

256 JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 117 (2013).
257 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (1999).
258 Id. at 156.
259 Randy E. Barnett,
The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional
Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 652–53 (2009).
260 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 256, at 33.
261 Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
514 n.240 (2010).
262 Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional
Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 295 n.46 (2010).
263 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 299 (2000) (quoted in
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual
Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1259 (2019), which discussed the
varied definitions of living originalism).
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called “the most important of originalist sources”264 is The
Federalist, “which explained the Founders’ intent.”265
In 1977, Raoul Berger published his originalism manifesto,
Government by Judiciary, which asked, “[w]hy is the ‘original
intention’ so important? . . . A judicial power to revise the
Constitution transforms the bulwark of our liberties into a
parchment barrier.”266 Berger offered this bulwark to defend the
majoritarian power of Congress from “the tendency of legal
liberalism to undermine legislative power and the rule of law.”267
Berger’s book thus had a “majoritarian, restraintist thrust” as it
was designed to protect legislative power from activist judges.268
Because Berger argued that courts should follow the intent of the
founders, Berger was labeled as a “strict intentionalist” by Paul
Brest,269 who in 1981 coined the word “originalism.”270 By coining
the word, Brest formalized originalism as a concept.271
Berger’s book had an entire chapter devoted to the fact that
the Framers explicitly excluded the judiciary from policymaking,
rejecting the idea of judges’ participation in a Council of Revision
of legislation, and citing the Framers in support.272 Nearly all
who spoke on this subject at the Convention or during the
ratification process agreed that judges should not be part of
policy-forming in the legislative process.273 Given the Framers’
strident opposition to judicial policy-making, originalists should
fiercely oppose judicial activism, even by originalist judges, and
reject giving judges the power to construct a nondelegation
doctrine that would enable them to act as a Council of Revision to
overturn regulatory legislation they disagree with.

264 Frank B. Cross, Originalism-the Forgotten Years, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 38 (2012)
(citing Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard, & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and
Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 329 (2005)).
265 Edwin Meese III, Challenges Facing Our System of Justice, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV.
303, 307–08 (2005). See discussion of this point in Frank B. Cross, Originalism—The
Forgotten Years, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 38 (2012).
266 BERGER, supra note 6.
267 JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 126 (2005).
268 Id. at 129.
269 Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L. J. 1063, 1089 (1981).
270 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980).
271 Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory
of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (2018) (“Only after Brest invented the term
“originalism” did originalists adopt the label and defend it.”).
272 BERGER, supra note 6, at 300 (“The Judiciary Was Excluded from Policymaking”).
273 Id. at 302 (citing BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18, 244 (1942)).
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Berger argued that what the Supreme Court was actually
doing was far more radical than merely formulating novel
interpretations. The Court instead was engaged in “what Justice
Harlan described as the Supreme Court’s ‘exercise of the
amending power,’ its continuing revision of the Constitution
under the guise of interpretation.”274 Berger said that his book
was designed to “demonstrate that the Court was not designed to
act, in James M. Beck’s enthusiastic phrase, as a ‘continuing
constitutional convention’. . .”275
Berger’s book stimulated such “an explosion of academic
interest in the framers’ intent,” that “responding to Berger’s
thesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry in
constitutional scholarship.”276 Originalist scholarship in the
1980s, influenced by Berger, also followed his lead and typically
argued that “the liberal reformist use of modern judicial power
threatened the rule of law and the formulation of public policy in
legislatures.”277 Hence, judicial restraint and the protection of
legislative power were the primary goals of early originalism.
B. Attacks on Intentionalist Originalism
With the advent of originalism, criticisms, sometimes harsh,
were inevitable. However, even before originalism was conceived
as a distinct method of constitutional interpretation, the use of
history and original intent to determine the meaning of the
Constitution had been harshly criticized. In his 1965 article “Clio
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,” Alfred H. Kelly identified
two almost inevitable problems with courts employing original
intent to determine the meaning of the Constitution.278 One was
the problem of “law office history,” where the courts pull out
selective quotes from the Framers or elsewhere that buttress
their points, without engaging in sufficient historical
investigation to see the entire historical picture, then consider
and cite only their favored authorities and texts while ignoring
the rest.279 Kelly argued that the Court used this tool to engage
in “extreme political activism, involving extensive judicial
intervention in contemporary political problems” and as a
BERGER, supra note 6, at 1 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964)).
Id. at 2.
Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 745, 753 (1983) (footnote omitted).
277 O'NEILL, supra note 267, at 135.
278 Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965).
279 Id. at 122 n.13 (“By ‘law-office’ history, I mean the selection of data favorable to
the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper
evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered.”).
274
275
276
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“precedent-breaking instrument” so that by purporting “to return
to the aboriginal meaning of the Constitution” the Court could
“declare that in breaking with precedent it was really
maintaining constitutional continuity.”280
A second hazard Kelly identified is how the Supreme Court,
by stating and relying on their particular restatement of
constitutional history, reifies that history, so that lesser courts
must accept as true the Court’s account of history, however
inaccurate. And even the Court itself must accept that reified
history to some extent because of the principle of stare decisis.
Kelly condemned the “creation of history a priori by what may be
called ‘judicial fiat’ or ‘authoritative revelation’”281 Kelly further
noted “In a sense, by quoting history, the Court made history,
since what it declared history to be was frequently more
important than what the history might actually have been.”282
While early originalists had very different purposes than
those of the courts that Kelly chastised, they faced similar
critiques. An early attack came from Professor Paul Brest, who
asserted, among other things, that it is difficult to determine the
“intent” of a group of people, that doing so for the drafters or the
ratifiers is almost impossible, and that even if that could be done,
translating that intent to modern problems is another fraught
challenge.283 Furthermore, there are considerable reasons to
reject being governed by intentions from the Founding Era, when
women and racial minorities were excluded from governmental
decision-making.284 Larry Simon argued, “The Constitution was
adopted by propertied, white males who had no strong incentives
to attend to the concerns and interests of the impoverished, the
nonwhites, or nonmales who were alive then, much less those of
us alive today . . . .”285 Other critics piled on, objecting to modern
Americans being ruled by an unchangeable (except through
amendment) intent from centuries ago, the often-discussed “dead
hand of the past.”286

Id. at 125.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
Brest, supra note 270, at 214–15.
Id. at 230.
285 Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1499 (1985).
286 Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277,
357 (1985) (“The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, for example, our treatment of
the liberty of free speech, and any theory of interpretation that demands that it does is a
bad theory.”).
280
281
282
283
284
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A notable early critic of the originalism project was Professor
Jefferson Powell, who argued that the “vast majority of
contemporary constitutional disputes involve facts, practices, and
problems that were not considered or even dreamt of by the
founders” and that applying the Constitution to questions it does
not answer requires any interpreter to “use some process of
generalization or analogy to go beyond what history can say.”287
Powell also attacked the idea that the Framers of the
Constitution intended or even expected that their intentions,
sometimes stated in secretly conducted debates, govern the
meaning of that document. Instead, Powell asserted that the
“framers shared the traditional common law view . . . that the
import of the document they were framing would be determined
by reference to the intrinsic meaning of its words or through the
usual judicial process of case-by-case interpretation.”288
Madison himself counseled against using the intentions of
the Framers as a guide to the meaning of the Constitution,
saying that that the sense of the Framers “could never be
regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the
Constitution.”289 That the Framers did not intend that their
intentions govern the meaning of the Constitution is evidenced
by the fact that they kept secret their journals of the convention’s
secretly conducted debates, at least until after the Constitution
had been ratified.290 As C.A. Lofgren notes, “[t]his strongly hints
that the delegates feared that if the journals were published,
they could affect subsequent interpretation.”291
C. Original Understanding Originalism
These criticisms had teeth, and even Bork himself came to
reject original intent originalism, saying no “even moderately
sophisticated originalist” holds that interpretative weight should
be given the subjective intent of the Framers.292 Some originalists
then shifted their focus to the meaning of the Constitution held
by the ratifiers instead.293 Since it was the ratification of the
H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 664–65 (1987).
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 903–04 (1985).
289 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1849).
290 Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST.
COMMENT. 77, 81 (1988).
291 Id. at 82.
292 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 218 (1990).
293 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113, 1137 (2003) (“The shift to
original understanding was part of an increased recognition that it was the action of the
287
288
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Constitution, not its drafting, that conferred on the Constitution
its legitimacy to govern the public, it is the intention of the
ratifiers, not the drafters, that matters, according to this theory.
And, some argued, the intent of the ratifiers is not mere evidence
of the Constitution’s meaning but rather determines that
meaning, or as Charles Lofgren stated, “how the ratifiers
understood the Constitution, and what they expected from it,
defines its meaning.”294
Original understanding originalism, however, retrospectively
assigns the ratifiers a completely different task than the one they
actually performed. The ratifiers did not need to understand all
the various terms of the Constitution, as their focus was on a
single question: should the Constitution be ratified?295 While the
meaning of individual terms collectively mattered in that
decision, the ratifiers never had to reach any group consensus on
what any Constitutional term meant. Furthermore, determining
the ratifiers’ collective understanding of the Constitution is
impossible. The debates over ratifying the Constitution were a
“cacophonous argument” and so are no valid guide to any
consensus understanding of its terms.296 With such diverse and
often contradictory sources, originalists can derive a host of
perhaps contradictory yet plausible interpretations, “few
conclusively verified or falsified.”297 With “the extraordinary
diversity of the polemics the campaign produced, and the
decentralized, unfocused nature”298 of the ratifiers’ discussions
and debates, Jack Rakove concludes that it is almost impossible
to “disaggregating a collective intention to ratify the Constitution
into original understandings of particular clauses”299 rendering
original understanding originalism unworkable.

Constitution's Ratifiers—state ratifying conventions in the case of the original document
and state legislatures in the case of the amendments—whose actions gave legal life to the
otherwise dead words on paper drafted by the Philadelphia Convention and the
Congresses proposing the amendments.”).
294 Lofgren, supra note 290, at 112.
295 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 17 (1996) (“The only understanding we can be entirely confident the
majority of ratifiers shared was that they were indeed deciding whether the Constitution
would ‘form a more perfect union’ than the Articles of Confederation . . . .”).
296 Id. at 132 (“That debate took the form not of a Socratic dialogue or an academic
symposium but of a cacophonous argument in which appeals to principle and common
sense and close analyses of specific clauses accompanied wild predictions of the good and
evil effects that ratification would bring.”).
297 Id. at 133.
298 Rakove, supra note 180, at 1597.
299 Id.
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D. Original Meaning Originalism
Since original understanding originalism shared the same
flaws as original intent originalism, some originalists created a new
vision of originalism, one that would focus instead on the
supposedly objective original public meaning of the text of the
Constitution. Bork explained, “The search is not for a subjective
intention. . . . [W]hat counts is what the public understood. . . . The
original understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in
secondary materials, such as debates at the [ratifying] conventions,
public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the
time, and the like.”300 Original public understanding originalism
therefore tries to step away from the subjective meaning that those
involved in the process may have intended and instead turns to a
supposedly objective meaning to be gleaned from all sorts
documents from the time. Original public understanding
originalism thus turned originalism into “an empirical investigation
of linguistic usage.”301
The grave hazard of original public meaning originalism is
that it strips words out of their context in the text of the
Constitution and potentially allows any uses of those words
during the Founding to be used to interpret the Constitution.
Original meaning originalists “continue to cherry pick quotes and
present this amateurish research as systematic historical
inquiry. In this method there is no serious attention to
establishing the relative influence of particular texts.”302 Seeking
a single original public meaning at the Founding for many of the
most important terms used in the Constitution is impossible.303
This search will too often fail on critical issues and so on many of
the most important issues would be a misbegotten method.304
E. A Panoply of Originalisms
Other varieties of originalism include libertarian
originalism, typically based on the idea that the Constitution’s

BORK, supra note 292, at 144.
Barnett & Bernick, supra note 271, at 10.
Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L. J. 625, 627 (2008).
303 Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO STATE L. J. 609, 617
(2008) (“The new originalism seeks the original public meaning of constitutional terms,
but there is (was) no single such meaning, again at least for interesting constitutional
terms.”).
304 James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1785, 1808 (2013) (“The quest for the original public meaning is misconceived because on
most important provisions there will not be a definitive original public meaning that will
be useful in resolving our disagreements, much less in resolving hard cases.”).
300
301
302
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legitimacy is based on its protection of liberty and natural rights,
rather than the consent of the governed,305 and progressive or
“Living Originalism,” the idea that the Framers intended future
generations to be free to interpret the standards and principals of
the Constitution and so avoid a static and unworkable
Constitution. Then there is original methods originalism, which
calls for the meaning of the Constitution to be gleaned “using the
interpretive methods that the enactors would have deemed
applicable to it.”306 However, there was no agreed-on set of
interpretive rules, given the conflicts and divisions of the
Founding Era, “including a deep rift separating Federalists from
Anti-Federalists and an even larger divide between popular and
elite approaches to constitutional texts.”307
This panoply of alternative and often conflicting originalist
methods gives judges cart blanche to choose whichever method
and sources best serve their personal preferences. Originalist
judges regularly cite to Madison and/or Hamilton in The
Federalist Papers, which indicates they are still focused on a
primitive form of original intent in which they pick quotes from a
few favored sources, choosing those from the Founding they
would likely agree with.308 The biases of originalist judges are
shown by which Founding Era texts they rely on. As Jamal
Greene noted, “Discounting the views expressed by Brutus or the
Federal Farmer in favor of those expressed by Publius is difficult
to explain on the logic of original-meaning originalism.”309
Far from originalism being a constraint on judges, the vast
smorgasbord of originalist options frees them to rule as they like and
justify their decision based on the originalist method that leads to
their personal desired result. Worse yet, originalist judges regularly
use originalist methods when doing so suits their purposes but ignore
them when it does not.310 Political scientists who have researched the
305 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). Ilan Wurman labels Barnett’s position “Libertarian
Originalism” and argues that “Richard Epstein takes essentially the same view of
constitutional legitimacy as Barnett.” Ilan Wurman, The Original Understanding of
Constitutional Legitimacy, 2014 BYU L. REV. 819, 825–26 (2014).
306 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 256, at 116.
307 Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 736 (2013).
308 Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1389, 1429 (2013).
309 Id. at 1430 (footnotes omitted).
310 Scott Lemieux, Antonin Scalia and the Death of Originalism, NEW REPUBLIC
(Feb. 24, 2016), http://newrepublic.com/article/130408/antonin-scalia-death-originalism
[http://perma.cc/WQQ2-76GS] (“Before and after Scalia, justices will use history when
they believe it supports their ex ante conclusions and ignore it when they believe it
doesn’t.”).
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Supreme Court regularly assert that the Justices’ personal and
political values hold more sway over their decisions than precedent,
text, and other positive law.311 Jamal Greene has argued that “in the
great battles between Justices Black and Frankfurter and Justices
Breyer and Scalia, the originalist position has indeed become as
much ‘rhetoric as decision procedure.’”312 With different originalisms
as ala carte options, originalism no longer is a unified decision
procedure, leaving it a mere rhetorical cloak hiding that judges are
merely following their own personal predilections.
F.

The Challenges of Originalisms
A great flaw of originalism is that lawyers, judges, and even
legal scholars are often inadequate or even terrible historians
and “constitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions
that are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers.”313 The
historical records originalists rely on are distressingly
incomplete.314 Because the record is “incorrect in some places,
has gaps in others, and contains tensions in still others,” it may,
as noted by Lee Strang, cause judges to “misperceive the original
intent or create a false original intent.”315
Justice Scalia gave perhaps the best description of the nearly
impossible challenge an originalist faces in seeking the
Constitution’s original meaning:
Properly done, the task requires the consideration of an enormous
mass of material . . . for example, . . . the records of the ratifying
debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation
of the reliability of that material—many of the reports of the ratifying
debates, for example, are thought to be quite unreliable. And further
still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual
atmosphere of the time— somehow placing out of mind knowledge
that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs,
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of
our day.316

SEGALL, supra note 244, at 156.
Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 85 (2009).
Martin S. Flaherty, supra note 140, at 525.
James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (“The purpose of this Article is to issue a
caveat about Convention records, to warn that there are problems with most of them and
that some have been compromised—perhaps fatally—by the editorial interventions of
hirelings and partisans. To recover original intent from these records may be an
impossible hermeneutic assignment.”).
315 Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism's Methodological Rigor:
Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1181, 1192 (2017).
316 Scalia, supra note 2, at 856–57.
311
312
313
314
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Such effort would be too difficult and time-consuming for
almost all judges, and would likely lead them to cherry-pick
meaning from a few favored sources and engage in “law-office
linguistics.”317 Consulting dictionaries from the Founding Era
will not resolve ambiguities, because dictionaries, especially old
ones, are designed to designate “linguistically permissible”
meanings, not indicate which meanings are most likely to apply
best to constitutional questions.318 Further, dictionaries define
words, not phrases and do not provide context. Finding
dictionaries that exactly capture the meaning of the Founding
Era is challenging because “dictionaries from the Founding Era
are often based on Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, which heavily
relied on earlier sources.”319
To solve these problems, some argue that a more robust
method would be to use a massive database of documents of the
Founding Era and undertake what are termed corpus linguistics
searches of hundreds of thousands of texts to determine how the
public would likely have understood the meaning of the
Constitution’s various terms.320 However, this “Big Data”
approach can give a false sense of objectivity, as those searching
the corpus can affect their results, inadvertently or not, by how
they construct their searches or how they subjectively interpret
the results of their searches.321 Judges would hard-pressed to
judge the accuracy of such searches, and so would likely just
accept whichever results match their personal policy preferences.
A great challenge for originalists is how to address
vagueness, ambiguity, or gaps in the Constitution that is not
resolved by resorting to texts from the Founding Era or teasing
out the original meaning of the terms. Originalists have proposed
various strategies, including the use of presumptions, searching
for liquidation of meaning, and the use of the “Construction
Zone” to resolve vagueness, ambiguity, or gaps in the
Constitution. Presumptions can guide judges when they are in
the “Construction Zone,” a territory posited by some originalists
as where meaning has run out, and yet courts must still construe
the terms after they have exhausted their efforts to interpret it
317 James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the Three Emoluments
Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of American English from
1760-1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 187 (2017).
318 James C Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New
Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 20, 22 (2016).
319 Id.
320 Donald L. Drakeman, Is Corpus Linguistics Better Than Flipping A Coin?, 109
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 81, 82 (2020).
321 Id. at 85.
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and decide a case.322 Others argue that there is no real
“Construction Zone,” and that construction is just an aspect of
interpretation.323
The original originalists argued for judicial restraint and a
presumption of constitutionality324 and Bork stated that courts
should defer to the legislature’s value judgment “unless it clearly
runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the
Constitution”325 and that democracy is impossible without such
judicial restraint.326 Originalists have increasingly rejected the
presumption of constitutionality and the judicial restraint it
provides.327 Randy Barnett, for example, argues instead for a
“general Presumption of Liberty,” based on the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, “which
places the burden on the government to establish the necessity
and propriety of any infringement on individual freedom.”328
Rather than being presumed constitutional, legislation that
restricts individual liberty would be presumed unconstitutional
unless the government can “show why its interference with
liberty is both necessary and proper . . . .”329 Such a shift in
presumptions would transform originalism from a system of
judicial restraint to one of judicial activism. It would transform
the Supreme Court into a Council of Revision, enforcing
deregulation policy by casting out legislation libertarians and
anti-regulation Conservatives that disagree with and so strike
against the administrative state. Originalists are torn between
two contradictory forms of originalism, and the “central
challenge . . . is over who is right: Professor Barnett, who claims
that originalism leads to judicial activism on behalf of a
322 Amul R. Thapar & Joe Masterman, Fidelity and Construction, 129 YALE L.J. 774,
795 (2020).
323 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 271, at 14 (“First, some critics have simply denied
the distinction exists. This was the tack taken by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner in
their 2012 book Reading Law. In that volume, Scalia and Garner contended that the
interpretation-construction distinction was based on a linguistic misunderstanding.”).
324 Lino A. Graglia, ‘‘Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1019, 1044 (1992) (arguing that “originalism should be understood as requiring a strong
presumption of constitutionality.”).
325 Bork, supra note 250, at 10–11.
326 Id. (“If the judiciary really is supreme, able to rule when and as it sees fit, the
society is not democrat.”).
327 Amy Coney Barrett, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 32 CONST. COMMENT.
4, 81 (2017) (“Originalists have refined their arguments in the intervening years,
however, and they have abandoned the claim that one should be an originalist because
originalism produces more restrained judges. Originalism has shifted from being a theory
about how judges should decide cases to a theory about what counts as valid, enforceable
law.”).
328 BARNETT, supra note 305, at 262.
329 Id.
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libertarian state, or Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, who claim
that originalism leads to judicial restraint.”330
Other originalists mix these methods, arguing that a
presumption of liberty should apply when considering federal
acts, while a presumption of constitutionality should apply to
state acts, based on the idea that the Constitution grants the
federal government enumerated, and hence limited powers, while
the states retain plenary police powers.331 Still other originalists
argue there should be no such widespread presumptions, as the
original interpretive conventions answer most constitutional
questions without needing presumptions.332 This widespread
disagreement about whether any of these presumptions should
be applied and, if so, which, indicates that originalism provides
judges with broad latitude to have their originalist
interpretations of the Constitution be guided by their personal
preferences.
The theory of liquidation is the idea that the founders
anticipated that judges or other government officials could
determine meaning after the Ratification and “settle practically
underdeterminate new law by adopting one permissible
interpretation rather than another.”333 Liquidation should only be
applied, according to this theory, if the original meaning is
unsettled
with
multiple
possible
meanings,
hence
“underdeterminate,” and the result “must be within the range of
permissible preliquidation underdeterminacy that exists after
application of other appropriate interpretive conventions.”334
Originalists find an argument for liquidation in statements by both
Hamilton335 and Madison.336 Philip Hamburger noted, “Although

330 Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2005).
331 See ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ORIGINALISM 61 (2017) (citing Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411, 423–28 (1996).
332 Id.
333 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97,
142 (2016).
334 Id.
335 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 1, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The erection
of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to
originate questions of intricacy and nicety; . . . Time only can mature and perfect so
compound a system, liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and adjust them to each other
in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.”).
336 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 1, at 236 (James Madison) (“All new laws,
though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most
mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications.”).
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only Madison and Hamilton appear to have descanted on the
liquidation of meaning, other Federalists also argued that
interpretation would resolve difficulties.”337 Other originalists,
however, oppose the idea that liquidation can fix the original
meaning of the Constitution. For example, Gary Lawson stated,
“Past precedents do not ‘fix’ or ‘liquidate’ (to use the in-vogue
Madisonian term) the Constitution’s communicative meaning.”338
Whether new “original meaning” could be created after the
Constitution was ratified is a burning issue regarding the
nondelegation doctrine. Because that doctrine is absent from the
Constitution, any rules regarding how it is to be applied would
have to be constructed by the current court either out of whole
cloth or based on post-Ratification actions either by Congress or
the courts. A new robust nondelegation would not be the result of
settling indeterminate meaning in the Constitution, however, but
rather would be the Court inserting what it thinks the
Constitution should have mandated but fails to do in any
recognizable manner.
Originalism has been criticized for having a significant race
and gender problem, given that the Constitution was drafted and
ratified by white men at a time when slavery was legal and women
were denied the vote. Some have argued that originalism was
redeemed from this taint by the end of slavery and the passage of
constitutional amendments that largely rectified, though many
think did not fully correct, the original errors in the Constitution.339
Those making this claim must wrestle with the failure of the
Reconstruction Amendments, however, a topic often ignored.340 The
narrative of originalism as restoring the original ideals, intent, and
meaning of the Constitution and its amendments is difficult to
reconcile with the struggles of the Civil Rights era. Jamal Greene
stated, “For me, as an African-American, a narrative of restoration
is deeply alienating; what America has been is hostile to my
personhood and denies my membership in its political community.
The only way I can call this Constitution my own is to view it
through a lens of redemption, the lens that originalism rejects.”341

337 Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 239, 310 (1989).
338 Lawson, supra note 26, at 41.
339 See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 256, at 106–12.
340 Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 980–82 (2012)
(“[T]he Reconstruction Era is painful and embarrassing to—and therefore best forgotten by—
many of those whose cultural and political commitments lead them to originalism.”).
341 Jamal Greene, Originalism's Race Problem, 88 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 517, 521
(2011) (emphasis omitted).
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IV. ORIGINALISM AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE DEBATE
A. Judicial Originalism and the Nondelegation Doctrine
The Supreme Court has only fitfully applied originalism to
decide nondelegation questions and, most notably and
thoroughly, only in dissents and concurrences. Doing so would be
a supremely challenging task, given the back-breaking challenge
to conduct sufficient historical research to accomplish the task.
Robert Pushaw noted that “originalism requires a historian’s
expertise and a vast amount of time—two resources that most
lawyers and all the Justices lack.”342 Even Justice Scalia, one of
the Court’s great originalists, agreed, noting that the Court
typically decides cases the same Term they are argued, giving
Justices only a few months to engage in any necessary historical
research and querying “Do you have any doubt that this system
does not present the ideal environment for entirely accurate
historical inquiry? Nor, speaking for myself at least, does it
employ the ideal personnel.”343
Justice Rehnquist conducted a minimalist originalist
analysis of the nondelegation doctrine in his concurrence in the
1980 case American Petroleum Institute, regarding regulations
designed to address occupational exposure to benzene.344 The
concurrence cites Locke for the proposition that “the legislative
can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and
place it in other hands.”345 However, Justice Rehnquist’s
concurrence does not indicate that Locke’s nondelegation ideas
influenced the Framers. It then cites Madison for the idea that
while a division of powers among the branches is a useful
principle, ““the degree of separation which the maxim requires,
as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly
maintained.”346 This seems to undercut Locke’s argument.
Rehnquist then stated, “It is the hard choices, and not the filling
in of the blanks, which must be made by the elected
342 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Comparing Literary and Biblical Hermeneutics to
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 463, 482 (2020)
(“Consequently, the Court typically cobbles together historical tidbits provided in
attorneys' briefs to justify a result—so-called ‘law office history.’”).
343 Scalia, supra note 2, at 861.
344 Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–86 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
345 Id. at 672–73 (“In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, published in 1690,
John Locke wrote that ‘[t]he power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a
positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can
have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.’”).
346 Id. at 673.
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representatives of the people.”347 For this proposition, which is
the central point of the concurrence, Justice Rehnquist offers no
authority.
Rehnquist addressed nondelegation again the next year in a
case involving whether Congress could delegate to the Secretary
of Labor, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the setting of cotton dust standards to protect
workers from unhealthy working conditions without explicitly
requiring a cost-benefit analysis.348 Justice Rehnquist agreed
that some delegation is permissible but would have held this
delegation unconstitutional.349 Justice Rehnquist’s reasons for
doing so show why a more robust nondelegation doctrine would
allow the Court to throw out legislation it disagreed with for the
most nit-picky of reasons. Justice Rehnquist agreed that
Congress could have constitutionally delegated the decision “to
set exposure standards without regard to any kind of cost-benefit
analysis.”350 However, because Congress did not expressly
require, prohibit, or permit a cost-benefit analysis, Rehnquist
thought delegating the decision on how to make a decision was
unconstitutional.351 “Require, prohibit, or permit” is the
legislative equivalent to “yes, no, or maybe.” Permitting but not
requiring a cost-benefit analysis would allow the agency to decide
whether to do so, which appears to the be result of the vague
language Congress chose, which does not direct any such choice.
It is unclear why Justice Rehnquist thought that granting the
agency discretion with one set of words was constitutional, while
using another set of words granting same discretion was not.
Justice Rehnquist would have thrown out the legislation not
because of the type or amount of power and/or discretion it
delegated, but rather because he did not like the specific terms
Congress used to delegate that discretion.
Justice Scalia, despite being a noted originalist who
addressed nondelegation on several occasions, was a staunch
defender of the nondelegation doctrine.352 He did not base his
nondelegation opinions on an originalist analysis, perhaps in

Id. at 687.
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 493 (1981).
Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I do not mean to suggest that Congress, in
enacting a statute, must resolve all ambiguities or must ‘fill in all of the blanks.”).
350 Id. at 545.
351 Id. at 547.
352 Kelley, supra note 241, at 2108 (“The Supreme Court has had no fiercer defender
of the nondelegation principle than Justice Antonin Scalia, and no more deferential
implementer of that principle when it came to applying it in real cases.”).
347
348
349
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recognition that the Constitution was silent on the subject.353 As
a law professor, Justice Scalia noted that the nondelegation
doctrine is a self-contradictory protection of the separation of
powers, as it would transfer legislative power not to agencies but
instead to the courts.354 Worse yet, while Congress may have
some control over agencies by passing new legislation or using
other leverage, Congress has no power over the Court to alter the
Court’s decisions. A robust nondelegation doctrine would thus
significantly weaken Congress under the guise of protecting it
and give the Court the power to interfere in Congress’s policy
decisions. Then-Professor Scalia asserted that nondelegation
should not generally be considered a justiciable issue and so,
“except perhaps in extreme cases,” should not be enforced by the
Court, requiring the sorts of judgments “much more appropriate
for a representative assembly than for a hermetically sealed
committee of nine lawyers.”355 As Calabresi and Lawson noted,
“Because it is impossible to formulate the nondelegation doctrine
in a fashion that does not leave considerable room for judicial
discretion, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia effectively
declared it nonjusticiable.”356
In 1986, then-Judge Scalia joined a per curiam opinion of the
three-judge court which addressed the constitutionality of
delegation in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.357 That opinion
did not challenge the laxity of enforcement of the nondelegation
doctrine,358 and further rejected the idea that there are “core
functions” of the legislative power that cannot be delegated.359
How such “core functions” differ from Justice Rehnquist’s
“quintessential legislative” choices is unclear, but it seems clear
that Judge Scalia was not following Justice Rehnquist’s lead on
nondelegation.

353 Id. at 2119 (“It is indeed conspicuously absent in Justice Scalia's nondelegation
jurisprudence that he never took the occasion independently to consider the original
meaning of the nondelegation doctrine.”).
354 See Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 REGUL. 25, 28 (1980) (“[T]o a
large extent judicial invocation of the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is a selfdenying ordinance–forbidding the transfer of legislative power not to the agencies, but to
the courts themselves.”).
355 Id.
356 Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 483, 486 (2014).
357 Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374, 1383–85 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub. nom.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
358 Id. at 1384.
359 Id. at 1385 (“We reject this ‘core functions’ argument for several reasons. First,
plaintiffs cite no case in which the Supreme Court has held any legislative power, much
less that over appropriations, to be nondelegable due to its ‘core function’ status.”).
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In the 1989 case, Mistretta v. United States, involving the
delegation to a Sentencing Commission of the power to determine
appropriate sentences, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, based his
defense of congressional delegation on nonjusticiability, stating
that while the nondelegation doctrine is “a fundamental element
of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily
enforceable by the courts” and that because no law can be
completely precise and therefore some policy judgments must be
“left to the officers executing the law and the judges applying it,
the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not
over a point of principle but over a question of degree. . . .”,
explaining why the Court has “almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the
law.”360 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta “reflects what might
be the most deferential approach to the nondelegation doctrine in
the whole United States Reports.”361 Justice Scalia did object,
however, to delegation of the legislative power to determine
appropriate sentences to an independent commission that
performed no executive function and so the delegation was not
ancillary to any Executive power.362
In Whitman v. American Trucking Association,363 Justice
Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, repeated his assertion
that the Court has “almost never felt qualified to second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment”
Congress can delegate to agencies.364 His opinion discussed
limitations of the nondelegation doctrine, stating “It is true
enough that the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable
varies according to the scope of the power congressionally
conferred.”365 However, his discussion of the nondelegation
doctrine and its limitations is based on Supreme Court precedent
from the last century and not on originalist sources.366
Other Justices have recently fired originalist shots across the
bow at congressional delegations in various concurring or
dissenting opinions, with Justice Thomas firing the first shot in
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Kelley, supra note 241, at 2116.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The lawmaking function of the
Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the
law or adjudication of private rights under the law.”).
363 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
364 Id. at 474 (quoting his own dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
365 Id. at 475.
366 Id. at 472–76.
360
361
362
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2001, writing separately in American Trucking Association to say
that “[o]n a future day . . . I would be willing to address the
question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too
far from our Founders’ understanding of separation of powers.”367
Justices Thomas368 and Gorsuch have led the charge. They now
may be joined by Justices Kavanaugh369 and Alito.370 Justice
Thomas’s originalist discussion of nondelegation has been the
most lengthy. Some argue that Justice Thomas’s originalism
seems driven by his policy preferences, including the argument
that “. . . Justice Thomas’ frequent resort to history is almost
certainly a function of his Federalist Society political and
jurisprudential views . . . .”371 He has been clear as to what he
considers the source of the nondelegation doctrine, stating, “I
locate that principle in the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and
III—not in the Due Process Clause.”372
In his concurrence in Association of American Railroads,
Justice Thomas laid out an extended history of the nondelegation
doctrine and its roots, tracing its origins to Greek and Roman law
and the concept of the rule of law, with stops at Bracton, Locke,
and Blackstone.373 He recounts the power of English kings to
issue royal proclamations and King Henry VIII prevailing on
Parliament to pass the Act of Proclamations in 1539, giving his
proclamations the force and effect of an Act of Parliament. By
basing much of the discussion on the English history and
multiple citations of one of his own previous concurring opinions,
Justice Thomas’s concurrence perhaps indicates how little
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2216 (2020)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Constitution does not permit the creation of officers
exercising ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasi-judicial powers’ in ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasijudicial agencies.’ No such powers or agencies exist. Congress lacks the authority to
delegate its legislative power . . . Nor can Congress create agencies that straddle multiple
branches of Government.” (citations omitted)).
369 See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“I write
separately because Justice GORSUCH's scholarly analysis of the Constitution's nondelegation
doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases . . . Like
Justice Rehnquist's opinion 40 years ago, Justice GORSUCH's thoughtful Gundy opinion
raised important points that may warrant further consideration in future cases.”).
370 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring).
371 Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses
of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 884–85 (1997).
372 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, Justice Gorsuch concurred in Dimaya, also on originalist grounds but
finding they led him to a different conclusion than Justice Thomas’s conclusion.
373 Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.R.s, 575 U.S. 43, 70–74, 86 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“We should return to the original meaning of the Constitution: The
Government may create generally applicable rules of private conduct only through the
proper exercise of legislative power. I accept that this would inhibit the Government from
acting with the speed and efficiency Congress has sometimes found desirable.”).
367
368
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evidence there is of original intent at the Founding. The
concurrence does cite to Madison regarding the importance of
keeping the powers separate, but also as to the difficulty of doing
so, in that “classifying governmental power is an elusive
venture.”374
Justice Thomas’s concurrence was the most extensive
attempt by an originalist Justice to justify the nondelegation
doctrine and seems a failure as an originalist project. The
concurrence points to no direct statements by framers or ratifiers
or other evidence sufficient to prove that, as a group, they
intended that the nondelegation doctrine be part of the
Constitution, nor does it point to any original meaning of words
in the Constitution that would mandate or indicate a bar on
delegation. Moreover, the concurrence ignores that the
nondelegation doctrine and the related non-encroachment
doctrine were rejected when they were proposed for the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights, respectively.
The concurrence ignores the fact that, during the
Constitutional Convention, the framers refused to give the
judiciary the kind of policy-making power that the nondelegation
doctrine would hand today’s Court. The concurrence does not
seem to involve an even-handed attempt to conduct the kind of
deep and difficult historical analysis Justice Scalia asserted
originalism requires or to discern the intent of the framers. While
quoting Locke and claiming his influence, the concurrence
displays no apparent research to determine whether the framers
or ratifiers were at all influenced by Locke or his nondelegation
dictum while crafting and ratifying the Constitution. Instead, it
appears to be an effort to turn thin, tenuous evidence into an
argument to gain the policy result Justice Thomas prefers. The
other originalists on the court, Justices Scalia and Alito, did not
join the concurrence, possibly because they thought it went too
far.375
Justice Gorsuch announced the libertarian motive
underlying his dissent in Gundy with the first line: “The
Constitution promises that only the people’s elected
representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting
liberty.”376 Article I vests all legislative power in Congress,377 but
Sessions, 138 S. Ct. at 1245–46.
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of
Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 63 (“[I]t is significant that neither Justice
Scalia nor Justice Alito joined Justice Thomas's concurrence in the judgment, with its
startlingly broad criticism of nondelegation.”).
376 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019).
374
375
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does not single out those “restricting liberty.”378 Justice Gorsuch
quickly runs into the limits of the almost nonexistent evidence of
a nondelegation doctrine at the Founding. His dissent reads like
an originalist’s greatest hits of asserting what the Framers of the
Constitution collectively believed,379 knew,380 insisted,381 or
understood,382 all without proof of any such collective intent or
understanding. The dissent states, “The framers understood,
too”, that it would frustrate “the system of government ordained
by the Constitution” if Congress could merely announce vague
aspirations and then assign others the responsibility of adopting
legislation to realize its goals.383 However, to make this
argument, Justice Gorsuch cites Marshall Field & Co., from
1892, which is hardly good evidence of what the Framers
understood.384 Justice Gorsuch asserts that the Framers
“believed the new federal government’s most dangerous power
was the power to enact laws restricting the people’s liberty.”385
This proposition about the collective Framers’ belief would be
impossible to prove, goes against common current originalist
rejection of the Framers’ intent as the basis for an originalist
understanding of the meaning of the Constitution, and is based
on the writing of only one of the Framers, James Madison.386
Justice Gorsuch asserts that if Congress can delegate its
legislative powers “to the executive branch, the ‘[v]esting
[c]lauses, and indeed the entire structure of the Constitution,’
would ‘make no sense.’”387 In making this assertion, Justice
Gorsuch cites noted libertarian law professor Gary Larson, again
showing Justice Gorsuch’s libertarian agenda not anchored in
original sources.388 Importing modern policy concerns into the
Constitution through judicial interpretation is the very thing
that originalism was originally designed to prevent. As Raoul
Berger noted, “A common historicist fallacy is to import our
twentieth-century conceptions into the minds of the Founders.”389

U.S. CONST. art I.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116.
Id. (“the framers believed,”).
Id. (“[t]he framers knew, too,”).
Id. (“the framers insisted,”).
Id. (“The framers understood, too”).
Id.
Id. at 2133 (citing Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
385 Id. at 2134.
386 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309–12 (James Madison)).
387 Id. at 2134–35 (citing Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L.
REV. 327, 340 (2002)).
388 Id.
389 BERGER, supra note 6, at 306.
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
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Justice Gorsuch boldly claims further knowledge of the
Framers’ understanding: “The framers knew, too, that the job of
keeping the legislative power confined to the legislative branch
couldn’t be trusted to self-policing by Congress; often enough,
legislators will face rational incentives to pass problems to the
executive branch.”390 Justice Gorsuch provides absolutely no basis
for this claim, which goes to the heart of whether the
nondelegation doctrine even exists as a constitutional mandate391
and which contradicts Madison’s statement in Federalist 51 that
the great security in preserving the separation of powers lies in
the self-interest and ambition of the members of each branch. The
dissent fails to mention that the Framers and the First Congress
both rejected adding nondelegation or a similar non-encroachment
doctrine to the Constitution.
Bork condemned judges inserting their own policy
preferences into the Constitution based on claims that they “are
supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understanding of the
Constitution of the United States. Value choices are attributed to
the Founding Fathers, not to the Court.”392 However, the dissent
points to no convincing evidence that the framers shared the
policy preferences that the nondelegation doctrine would achieve.
As Mortenson and Bagley note, “None of the sources [in the
dissent] address whether the Founders believed that a law
passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President
was unconstitutional if it delegated too much authority or
authority of the wrong kind.”393
Justice Gorsuch then proceeds to construct his own test for
impermissible delegation, even though he acknowledges that at
least one of the Framers noted the difficulty of doing so, stating that
“Madison acknowledged that ‘no skill in the science of government
has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient
certainty, its three great provinces—the legislative, executive, and
judiciary.’”394 Justice Gorsuch cobbles together his proposed test
from various Court decisions. From the 1825 case, Wayman
v. Southard, Justice Gorsuch gleaned the following rule: “First, we
know that as long as Congress makes the policy decisions when
regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to ‘fill
up the details.’”395 From cases starting in 1813, Justice Gorsuch

390
391
392
393
394
395

Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019).
See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 16–17.
Bork, supra note 325, passim.
See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 16–17.
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 227 (James Madison)).
Id. at 2136 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 31, 43 (1825)).
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concluded: “Second, once Congress prescribes the rule governing
private conduct, it may make the application of that rule depend on
executive fact-finding.”396 And as a last part of the test for
permissible delegation Justice Gorsuch added: “Third, Congress may
assign the executive and judicial branches certain non-legislative
responsibilities.”397 This part of the test is intended to deal with
occasions where Congress’s legislative authority “overlaps with
authority the Constitution separately vests in another branch.”398
In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch condemns what he calls the
“mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’ remark” as having
“no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution in history,
or even in the decision from which it was plucked.”399 However,
he would replace more than a century of what he labels “the
intelligible principle misadventure”400 with his own brand-new
nondelegation test with no foundation in the original meaning of
the Constitution and cobbled together from such sources as his
reading of older Supreme Court cases on nondelegation. Justice
Gorsuch would judicially amend the Constitution not only to
include a nondelegation doctrine, but also one with the specific
terms that he himself has newly created. The first originalists
would likely look on such judicial activism with dismay.
Justice Gorsuch might argue that he would not change the
meaning of the Constitution with his new rules on nondelegation,
but rather merely its application. He has written, “Originalism
teaches only that the Constitution’s original meaning is fixed;
meanwhile, of course, new applications of that meaning will arise
with new developments and new technologies.”401 However, his
creation of his own nondelegation test gets that statement exactly
backwards. Justice Gorsuch would base a new meaning of the
Constitution on the old judicial applications. Justice Gorsuch might
assert that Supreme Court decisions well after the Founding have
liquidated the meaning of the nondelegation doctrine. However, it is
contradictory to assert as Justice Gorsuch said that “the
Constitution’s meaning was fixed at its ratification. . .”402 and that
court decisions decades or even centuries later can fix the original
meaning of the Constitution where it is vague.

396 Id. at 2136–37 (citing Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
382, 388 (1813) and Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U.S. 385, 393 (1883)).
397 Id. at 2137.
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 Id. at 2141.
401 NEIL M. GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 111 (2019).
402 Id. at 110.
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While these Justices have cast their nondelegation discussions in
originalist terms, it is difficult to determine what form of originalism
they appear to be following. They do not specify what sources they
view as trustworthy to determine the original meaning. They do not
discuss the original meaning of the word “vest” and what that
meaning says about the permissibility of legislative delegation.
Instead, they too often engage in a primitive and discredited form of
originalism in which they merely cherry-pick statements of Locke
and their favored Founding Era sources and announce what the
Founders understood.
Bork noted that originalism requires courts to stay their
hands for “entire ranges of problems and issues” as courts “will
say of particular controversies that no provision of the
Constitution reaches the issues presented, and the controversies
are therefore not for judges to resolve.”403 Here, there is no
provision that contains a nondelegation doctrine or determines
when it should apply. Therefore, under the original originalist
approach, originalist judges should stay their hand.
B. The Academic Debate over Originalists’ Claims of
Nondelegation at the Founding
Legal scholars have also extensively analyzed an originalist
approach to the nondelegation conundrum, with a fierce debate
among academics as to whether Congress delegating rule-making
authority was considered constitutional at the Founding, and if
so, how much, when, and why. In the course of this debate,
academics have recently unearthed a trove of new evidence about
legislative delegation at the Founding.
Posner and Vermeule fired the first salvo in 2002 with an
article arguing against the nondelegation doctrine by listing a
number of early statutes that provide for delegation of discretionary
rule-making power to the Executive Branch, including statutes
regarding military pensions,404 trade with Indian tribes,405
patents,406 acquiring land on the Potomac for the Capitol,407 giving
the mitigating or remitting fines and forfeitures,408 and paying

BORK, supra note 292, at 163.
Act of Sept. 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 95. See also Act of March 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 218 (reauthorizing
pensions “under such regulations as the President of the United States may direct”).
405 Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137, 137.
406 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
407 Act of July 16, 1790, 1 Stat. 130, 130.
408 See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713,
719 (1969) (citing Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122, 123).
403
404
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wounded or disabled military.409 The argument is that if such laws
were passed in America’s infancy, clearly the Founding generation
did not think delegating legislative power was a problem. In
discussing such Federalist-era delegations, Jerry Mashaw
exclaimed, “[s]ome of these delegations were so broad that one
might wonder whether a twenty-first-century court would be able to
find any standards guiding the exercise of administrative
authority.”410
These statutes, along with numerous others added by
various researchers,411 have become a battleground on which
originalists’ claims of nondelegation at the Founding have been
fought. New evidence of delegation at the Founding has been
discovered by Chabot and Parrillo. Chabot uncovered previously
overlooked evidence of delegation debates in a 1790 act on
handling the public debt412 which gave members of the Executive
Branch broad discretion to buy national debt413 despite the fact
that such policy decisions “had enormous implications for the
national economy and private creditors” and could “jeopardize
the United States’ ability to obtain future credit.”414 Chabot notes
that while Congress repeatedly delegating broad powers, there
was discussion of limiting the amount to be borrowed and there
were “no records of qualified objections suggesting that Congress
could not delegate power to resolve important questions.”415
Parrillo analyzed The Direct Tax Legislation of 1798 and
found that it contained extensive delegation of rulemaking power
that affected private property and was enacted without
constitutional objection.416 The legislation provided federal
boards in each of the state’s vast discretionary powers and,
Parrillo argues, “left the principles and methods of valuation
open and allowed the federal boards in the individual states to
fill the gap.”417 Whittington and Iuliano extended the history of
delegation into the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
finding only rare invalidation of legislation on a nondelegation
basis in state courts and almost none in federal courts.418

Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 11, 1 Stat. 119, 121.
Mashaw, supra note 122, at 1339–40.
See Nicholas R. Parrillo, supra note 142 (manuscript at 14–16). See also
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 332–66.
412 Parrillo, supra note 142 (manuscript at 31) (citing Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186).
413 Id. (citing Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186 §§ 1–2).
414 Id. (manuscript at 32).
415 Id. (manuscript at 35).
416 See generally id.
417 Id. (manuscript at 54).
418 See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 221, at 379.
409
410
411
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Jennifer Mascott, in an article about early customs law,
provides a useful window into how Congress and the Executive
Branch maintained the separation of Legislative and Executive
powers in practice immediately following the Founding, showing
they could do so without the judicial maintenance of a
constitutional bar on delegation.419 After extensively scouring the
debates over early customs law and the establishment of the
Department of the Treasury for evidence of discussion on
delegation, Mascott does not mention any instance where any
member claimed that the Constitution limited Congress’s power to
delegate its legislative powers. Instead, what she reports is
members scrupulously protecting the power of the House, which
would render a court-enforced nondelegation doctrine
unnecessary.420
Originalist defenders of nondelegation often deal with these
early statutes with the claim that they include a smaller
delegation of legislative power than Congress might have
made,421 are simply examples of Congress inconsistently
following the nondelegation doctrine,422 or constitute exceptions
to that doctrine.423 And from Congress’s early delegations, some
would construct a rule limiting Congress now to delegating
legislative power only in the same ways it did in its early
existence. It is difficult to justify a claim that somehow the
Constitution prohibits Congress from making any delegations
now that are not similar to delegations it made in the early years
of the Republic, especially given how dramatically changed the
country and its government are. Holding today’s Congress to the
delegations it made in its early years is an odd form of estoppel,
that by delegating only in the manner it deemed necessary at the

419 See Jennifer Mascott, Early Customs Laws and Delegation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1388, 1394 (2019).
420 Id. at 1441 (citing DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (4 Mar. 1789–3 Mar. 1791), reprinted in 10 DEBATES IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES lxi, lxi–lxiv (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992)
at 756). While one member stated that he took improving the revenue “to be the peculiar
business of the federal legislature,” in the end, the House voted to empower the Secretary
of Treasury to “digest and prepare plans for the improvement and management of the
revenue.” Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65.
421 See Wurman, supra note 66, at 23–24.
422 See id. at 23.
423 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line
Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton
v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 271–72 (2001) (“I argue that the nondelegation
doctrine probably does not apply to various matters. . . . Thus, the formalist nondelegation
doctrine can explain the exceptions for foreign and military affairs, some of the early
delegations and traditional practices that appear to assume the constitutionality of
delegations, such as annual appropriations and the conferral of military discretion.”).
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beginning of the Republic, Congress should now be
constitutionally estopped from delegating in any other manner.
Estoppel, however, is typically not applied against the United
States, as “the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to
the rule of law is undermined.”424
Those attacking the idea of nondelegation at the Founding
have employed more theoretical tools in addition to pointing out
all of the times Congress in its first years delegated its legislative
power. Posner and Vermeule claim that any bar on delegation
was strikingly limited: “Neither Congress nor its members may
delegate to anyone else the authority to vote on federal statutes
or to exercise other de jure powers of federal legislators.”425 In
other words, Congress may delegate legislative powers so long as
it does not allow federal agencies to vote on federal statutes. This
is akin to the idea, expressed by Madison in Federalist 47, that a
legislature cannot delegate its whole power of legislation, though
it may give what Madison called a “partial agency” and so gain
control through a more limited legislative delegation. Hence no
delegation of legislative power to agencies is barred unless
Congress allows them to act as legislators. Posner and Vermeule
build their argument on earlier work by Harold J. Krent426 and
Kenneth Culp Davis.427 Posner and Vermeule’s article was
criticized by Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, who
dispute this view of delegation, though do not seek to prove that
the conventional nondelegation doctrine is enshrined in the
Constitution.428 They argued, instead, that the legislative power
at issue in the nondelegation doctrine is much broader than just
the power to vote on legislation or act as a member of Congress.
As noted by Mortenson and Bagley, Alexander and Prakash’s
“evidence was heavy on citations to theorists like Locke,
Montesquieu, and Blackstone, but light on concrete evidence
from the Founding.”429

Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1723.
Id. at 1735 n.51; see also Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 710, 738–39 (1994) (gathering early statutes that provide for delegation
by Congress and noting “[i]n addition, the early history of the republic furnishes scant
support for vigorous enforcement of a nondelegation doctrine.”).
427 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 1735 n.51; see also Davis, supra note 408, at
719–20 (1969) (“Not only is delegation without meaningful standards a necessity for
today's governments at all levels but such delegation has been deemed a necessity from
the time the United States was founded, as anyone can quickly confirm by examining the
statutes enacted by the 1st Congress, which was made up largely of the same men who
wrote the Constitution.”).
428 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 132, at 1328.
429 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 285.
424
425
426
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Mortenson and Bagley argued that Legislative and
Executive power was defined much differently in the Founding
Era, and what we would consider a delegation of legislative
power to federal agencies would not have been considered that
back then.430 Mortenson and Bagley assert that legislative power
was defined more broadly and simply at the Founding and was,
as Montesquieu explained, “no more than the general will of the
state.”431 They also state that Executive power was defined much
more thinly then, simply as “the narrow but potent authority to
carry out projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative
power.”432 In other words, the ability to create rules that
governed private behavior could be part of the legislative power if
it were done in the creation of a plan or policy and also part of
the Executive power if it were used at the direction of Congress
to carry out legislative instructions.433 Any particular act can be
either legislative, if it is done in the creation of a plan or issuing
instructions to the Executive Branch, or Executive, if it is done
by the Executive Branch to implement those instructions,
Mortenson and Bagley argued.434
To make their case, originalist defenders of the
nondelegation doctrine should present convincing evidence from
the Founding that nondelegation was widely discussed and that
the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution understood that it
included the doctrine, at least implicitly. To the extent that
originalists depend on Locke’s Second Treatise as justification for
nondelegation, they should acknowledge and address the
historians’ accounts of how Locke’s influence plummeted as soon
as the Revolutionary War started, and that Locke’s influence in
America after that has been discounted generally by those who
have studied it. And if they value the original meaning of the
Constitution’s terms, they should wrestle with the original
meaning of the word “vest,” which is crucial to an analysis of
Congress’s ability to delegate the legislative power with which it
is vested. Such efforts, however, have not yet been made.
Also worrisome is the fact that the various originalist
defenders of the nondelegation doctrine use radically different
methods of originalism and different bases and evidence for their
claims of nondelegation at the Founding, even switching
Id. at 294.
Id. (citing 1 M. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws bk. XI, ch.
VI, at 201 (London, printed for T. Evans & W. Davis 1777)).
432 Id. at 315.
433 Id.
434 Id.
430
431
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regularly where nondelegation could be found in the
Constitution. However, one senses a joy from originalists in this
debate, in that the opponents of nondelegation seem to be taking
originalist claims and methods seriously to argue in such detail
over evidence of delegation at the Founding. Wurman seems
especially happy that Mortenson and Bagley are arguing over the
doctrine on originalist turf, and hence “at least recognizing that
originalist work is possible.”435
Wurman, in his article arguing for nondelegation at the
Founding, indicates that he is more an original intent originalist
than an original meaning originalist, stating that “originalists
usually look to text, structure, intent, and early historical
practice to ascertain the likely original meaning, or the range of
plausible meanings, of a particular constitutional provision.”436
Wurman also asserts “intended meaning is often good evidence of
the actual textual meaning.”437 He does not in his article attempt
to discern the original meaning of the Constitution’s words.
Wurman’s article section on “The Positive Evidence of a
Nondelegation Doctrine: Explicit Statements and Arguments” is
stunning on what it omits: any mention of discussion by the
Framers or ratifiers at the time the Constitution was drafted and
ratified.438 One would think that if the Constitution embodied the
nondelegation doctrine as a fundamental principle, the Framers
and ratifiers would have discussed that at some length. If they
did not, as Wurman’s silence indicates, that is strong evidence
that they did not intend the Constitution to contain a
nondelegation doctrine.439 By comparison, when Wurman
discusses other related topics such as Institutionalism and the
Separation of Powers, his text is chock-a-block with references to
the Federalist, indicating that these topics were in fact widely
discussed at the Founding.440 Wurman acknowledges that it is
impossible to conclusively prove nondelegation at the Founding,
stating “To be sure, the history is a bit messy, precluding any kind
of categorical conclusion.”441 Instead of discussing evidence from the
Wurman, supra note 66, at 5.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 9 n.26.
Id. at 14–29.
See John Harrison, Judicial Interpretive Finality and the Constitutionality Text,
23 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 33 (2006) (“Elephants leave traces when they pass by. That is
true about the Constitution as it is elsewhere . . . . One way to tell whether the
Constitution adopts a principle is thus to look for its traces, and one way to do that is to
ask: If the framers had planned to include the principle, or had assumed that other
decisions they had made entailed the principle, where would it manifest itself?”).
440 Wurman, supra note 66, at 3–38.
441 Id. at 1.
435
436
437
438
439
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Founding about the intent of the Framers and/or ratifiers or the
original public meaning of the Constitution when ratified, Wurman
instead points to “three key episodes”442 as evidence of a
nondelegation doctrine: (1) debates over a non-encroachment
amendment as part of the Bill of Rights that did not pass Congress,
(2) the establishment of the post roads, and (3) the Alien Friends
Act. He asserts that these debates and events provide evidence of a
nondelegation doctrine, but instead the non-encroachment
amendment was rejected and, as demonstrated by Mortenson and
Bagley, the other debates show that Congress did delegate despite a
few scattered objections.443
Aaron Gordon published an originalist defense of
nondelegation in 2019,444 and responded directly to the Mortenson
and Bagley article in 2020 with similar arguments. In his 2019
article, Gordon undercuts the idea that original meaning
originalism can answer whether the nondelegation doctrine exists.
He states, “vague language” of the Constitution is “arguably
susceptible to equally plausible readings both supporting and
undermining the Nondelegation Doctrine” and so skips “textual
and syntactic hyper-analysis . . .”445 Gordon forgoes any theoretical
justification of the original sources he relies on, other than noting
that original meaning originalism does not lead to any settled
answer and that other scholars and jurists cite similar
materials.446
Gordon presents as evidence of nondelegation at the Founding
matters discussed previously that do not demonstrate nondelegation
at the Founding, such as the debunked great influence of Locke on
the Framers of the Constitution, the pre-Revolutionary Otis
pamphlet urging Parliament to recognize colonial legislatures and
Adams’ citing it as an influence on the Revolution, and the
nondelegation amendment rejected in the Convention. To that,
Gordon adds (1) nondelegation references in American editions of
Rutherforth’s Institutes of Natural Law that were published after the
Constitution was ratified; (2) Hamilton’s discussions in the Federalist

Id. at 26.
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 282.
See Gordon, supra note 43, at 718.
Id. at 733–34.
Id. at 734–35 (“Historical materials from this period, to the extent they express
views that were common and mostly uncontested at that time, are generally regarded as
valid evidence of the Constitution's original meaning, with an ideologically diverse array
of commentators and jurists routinely citing sources from as late as the 1830s in making
originalist arguments about constitutional provisions adopted prior to 1800, or sources
similarly temporally removed from the adoption of whichever provision's meaning is at
issue.”).
442
443
444
445
446
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about the President’s pardon powers; and (3) Jefferson’s complaints
that Parliament had let the King decide when two wharves could be
reopened.447 Tellingly, Jefferson did not claim that such delegation to
the unelected monarch was not permitted, but rather that if
Parliament delegated its legislative powers too often to the King, it
could lead to despotism.448 In other words, Gordon presents no
convincing evidence that the Framers of the Constitution, who had
provided for an elected President as Executive, not an unelected
monarch, intended that the Constitution include a nondelegation
doctrine.
Gordon proposes his own version of the nondelegation doctrine,
what he calls “a historically-grounded judicial test for identifying
unconstitutional delegations: ‘a statute unconstitutionally delegates
legislative power when it 1) allows the agent . . . to issue general
rules governing private conduct that carry the force of law and 2)
makes the content or effectiveness of those rules dependent upon
the agent’s policy judgment, rather than upon a factual
contingency.’”449 Since Gordon is an originalist, one might think
these rules would be what Gordon thinks the Constitution meant
when ratified. However, his rules are all drawn from what Congress
actually did after the Framing.
Gordon’s 2020–2021 article presents a moving target, as it
was last updated April 30, 2021. It argues with Mortenson and
Bagley’s definition of “legislative power,” cites mid-nineteenth
century treatises on agency450 and argues that because Congress
was an agent it could not delegate its powers, ignoring cases in
the nation’s first years indicating that a legislature and
government officials could delegate some aspect of their
powers.451 Nonetheless, it adds little additional evidence of
nondelegation at the Founding.
A much more ambitious originalist defense of the
nondelegation doctrine has been mounted by Gary Lawson,
beginning with an article published about the same time as
Posner and Vermeule’s and then in a another replying directly to
their article. In his article, Delegation and Original Meaning,
Lawson attempts a full originalist defense of the nondelegation
doctrine and argues for its revival.452 Lawson, to his credit, starts
Id. at 739–41.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 781.
Gordon, supra note 181 (manuscript at 7).
Id. at 3 (ignoring such cases as Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799) and
Hunt v. Burrel, 5 Johns. 137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809)).
452 Lawson, supra note 128, at 327.
447
448
449
450
451
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with a blunt admission that “there is nothing in the Constitution
that specifically states, in precise terms, that no other actor may
exercise legislative power or that Congress may not authorize
other actors to exercise legislative power.”453
Lawson states that the pertinent question is what the
general public would have understood “if all relevant information
and arguments had been brought to its attention” and “historical
sources remain relevant and probative but are inconclusive.”454
And because documents can have “meanings that are latent in
their language and structure even if they are not obvious to
observers at a specific moment in time . . . the role and relevance
of historical sources is more attenuated.”455 Original meaning
originalism, then, puts Lawson in a tight box. Unless it can be
shown that a fully informed public at the time would have
understood that the Constitution contained a nondelegation
doctrine, then it does not matter whether some Framers or other
individuals at the time thought that or acted as if it did.
A discussion of whether a fully informed public would have
understood that vesting legislative power in Congress limits its
delegation should naturally turn on what such a hypothetical public
would understand is meant by the term “vest.” Instead, Lawson
relies on his assertion that powers vested cannot be delegated
unless specifically permitted, ignoring that an informed public
might well have concluded that “vesting” the legislative power in
Congress implies that Congress can delegate those powers.
Lawson searches for possible clauses of the Constitution that
would permit delegation, stating that a “number of modern
scholars have indeed invoked [the Sweeping Clause of Article I]
as a possible constitutional authorization to Congress to confer
broad discretion on administrators.”456 Lawson notes that the
Sweeping Clause “requires all executory laws to be both
‘necessary’ and ‘proper,’ in the conjunctive” and asserts that the
“term ‘proper’ would have been understood to describe “power
that is ‘within the peculiar jurisdiction or responsibility of the
relevant governmental actor.’”457 Delegation of legislative power,
if otherwise permitted, would clearly be within Congressional
jurisdiction or responsibility, however. And so, Lawson states the
Id. at 335.
Id. at 341 n.51.
Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347 (quoting Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,
291 (1993)).
453
454
455
456
457

Do Not Delete

786

5/19/2021 12:57 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:3

question is whether a “fully informed eighteenth-century
audience would have viewed a statute purporting to authorize an
executive agent to make laws as ‘improper’ . . .”458
Lawson does not provide a full answer that question in this
article, stating that “it is impossible to give full treatment here to
the extensive textual, structural, and historical arguments that
justify this conclusion.”459 Instead, he argues that because of the
structure of the Constitution, the Sweeping Clause would not be
understood to permit delegation, as it “incorporates the basic
constitutional structure; it does not offer a vehicle for
circumventing it.” Lawson relies on his understanding of the
Constitution rather than on good evidence of what a hypothetical
fully informed public would have understood.
Lawson returned to this issue in 2005 and agreed that
delegation would be authorized by the Necessary and Proper
Clause if it matched Madison’s requirement that to be
“necessary” there must be a definite connection between a law’s
means and its ends and they must be linked “by some obvious
and precise affinity.”460 Lawson acknowledged that this would
provide for legislative delegation so long as Congress shows such
delegation is connected to Congress’s legislative ends.461 Lawson
strained to find some additional meaning in the word “proper” to
hang the nondelegation doctrine on, but largely fails.
In the end, Lawson was reduced to finding the nondelegation
doctrine inherent in the structure of the Constitution, not justified
by any of the express terms thereof or what a fully informed public
would have understood from specific provisions in the Constitution.
He states that the Nondelegation Doctrine “is not a principle
expressly stated in the Constitution, but it is a better inference from
the overall structure of the Constitution than is the contrary
principle.”462 And so, Lawson would have us infer the nondelegation
doctrine not from original meaning but from our current
understanding of the Constitution. Aaron Gordon, in his originalist
defense of nondelegation, stated that “a grandiose, abstract case for
the Nondelegation Doctrine based on arguments from constitutional

Id. at 350.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 448.
461 Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The Proper Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 248 (“If Congress wants to vest
discretion in the President, Congress had better be prepared to show in a direct and
immediate fashion how the precise scope and character of that discretion is important to
the execution of federal powers.”).
462 Id. at 263.
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structure and accountability would be worthless unless buttressed
by a wealth of historical sources. . .” demonstrating that the
founders would have thought that inappropriate delegation by
Congress would be unconstitutional.463 Lawson, however, provided
no such historical sources.
Post-Gundy, but before the Mortenson and Bagley article,
Lawson again discussed possible sources for the nondelegation
doctrine in both a 2017 book with Guy Seidman464 and a 2019
article about Gundy.465 In his article, Gary Lawson acknowledged
that he had previously asserted that the nondelegation doctrine
resided in the Vesting Clauses, and at other times, in the
Sweeping Clause.466 However, he stated that he had recently
come to a different conclusion, laid out in both the book and
article, which will be discussed jointly here, that both of his
previous lines of argument are “subsumed under and superseded
by a more fundamental consideration. . . The Constitution is a
kind of agency, or fiduciary, instrument.”467 And that because the
different branches of government are fiduciaries with their
powers delegated to them by the people, they cannot subdelegate
their authority because there is no express authority to do so in
the Constitution, nor is there, Lawson claimed, custom or strict
necessity which could justify such subdelegation.468 Furthermore,
as agents, the powers of Congress and the Executive Branch
must be strictly construed.469 And based on this agency analysis,
Lawson boldly asserted, “The rule against subdelegation of
legislative authority is among the clearest constitutional rules
one can imagine.”470
A fundamental weakness in this argument, which seems a
constitutional application of the Delegata maxim, is the dearth of
evidence that the Constitution is essentially an agency or fiduciary
instrument, or should be construed as such. Even Lawson noted the
many alternative views as to what the Constitution is most like,
including a “‘superstatute,’ a ‘compact,’ a ‘treaty,’ a ‘corporate
charter’” and numerous others.471 Given this wide range of

Gordon, supra note 181 (manuscript at 53).
See generally GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”
UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 1 (2017).
465 See generally, e.g., Lawson, supra note 26, at 31; LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note
464, at 1.
466 Lawson, supra note 26, at 43.
467 Id.
468 Id. at 44.
469 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 464, at 105.
470 Id. at 117.
471 Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
463
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possibilities, why should we base our interpretation of the
Constitution on Lawson’s recent understanding that it is an agency
or fiduciary agreement?
Lawson and Seidman’s reply is that “the agency-law
character of the Constitution” was “so obvious to the founding
generation that it scarcely bore mention.”472 The Constitution as
agency arrangement was mentioned at least once in the
Founding Era,473 but this rare mention does not the Constitution
an agency agreement make.
As Justice Scalia said, the greatest defect of originalism is the
difficulty of applying it correctly and plumbing the original meaning
of the Constitution’s now ancient text.474 The difficulty and
complexity of the historical and theoretical research that the
dueling nondelegation scholars have engaged in is staggering. They
have argued at great length and discord about the meaning of
arcane texts by writers few lawyers and judges have even heard of.
Reading their lengthy and contentious articles, one might think
that whether the nondelegation doctrine even exists somehow turns
on how to interpret the writings of eighteenth-century English
natural law theorist Thomas Rutherforth, whose Institutes of
Natural Law with its lectures on Grotius is likely missing from
most judges’ chambers. Surely, the Framers did not intend that
American lawyers and judges would in perpetuity require a deep
understanding of Rutherforth’s and Locke’s writings in order to
know something as crucial and straightforward as whether
Congress can delegate some rule-making power to federal agencies
and how much. The purpose of having a written Constitution is, at
least according to some originalists, to have a clear, public, and
compact description of the basic rules governing the United States.
Originalism would instead turn the Constitution into an inscrutable
document that could be understood only with a post-graduate
education in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English and
European legal and political theory and English history since the
Magna Carta of 1215, with a special emphasis on the proclamations
of Henry VIII circa 1539.
The dueling scholars’ debate is filled with accusations of
misunderstanding and mistakes in the other side’s historical and
theoretical analysis, with claims such as “that their misreading
of European delegation theory becomes the Constitution’s

Id. at 7.
Id. at 3 (citing 4 THE DEBATE IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 148–49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1907)).
474 Scalia, supra note 2, at 856.
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delegation theory, without consideration of what the Constitution
actually said.”475 Further examples abound. “It is hard to
overstate the ahistoricity of this claim.”476 “The historical and
logical infirmities in Mortenson and Bagley’s analysis are
many. . .”477 No doubt I have made errors in my historical
analysis in this Article, since I have not been trained as a
historian, but should the meaning of the Constitution be
determined by the results of historical research that almost all
lawyers and judges and even legal scholars are likely to get at
least somewhat wrong? Some originalist Justices and scholars
argue that Locke’s views on nondelegation and the separation of
powers were an important influence on the framers and are
central element of the existence of the nondelegation doctrine as
an element of the Constitution. Yet those who would rely on
Locke’s influence on the framers do not provide sufficient
historical evidence regarding whether Locke’s views on
delegation actually influenced the Framers or ratifiers, despite
the decades of historians’ study and analysis of the rise and fall
of Locke’s influence.478
Justice Scalia noted the little time and less than ideal
environment and personnel that members of the Supreme Court
have for an “entirely accurate historical inquiry . . .”479 Justice
Thomas’s
and
Gorsuch’s
opinions
demonstrate
how
insurmountable that challenge is. Justice Scalia tellingly did not
share their views on nondelegation and might well have not
agreed with their historical analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of the nondelegation doctrine can perhaps be
best viewed as a conversation between James Madison and
Justice Antonin Scalia from centuries apart. Madison feared that
Congress would usurp the powers of the Executive and Judicial
branches and so become tyrannical. He was willing to hand over
some legislative power and oversight to the executive and judicial
HAMBURGER, supra note 119, at 383.
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 297.
Gordon, supra note 181 (manuscript at 2).
Mortenson and Bagley do spot the issue in a footnote and cite to a blog post that
discusses it. Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 8, at 289 n.66 (citing Richard Primus, John
Locke, Justice Gorsuch, and Gundy v. United States, BALKINIZATION (July 22, 2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/07/john-locke-justice-gorsuch-and-gundy-v.html
[http://perma.cc/2EMD-78BT]). Philip Hamburger cites to the work of historians in a
“brief sampling of the scholarship” on Locke’s influence, but does not tell readers what he
learns from it, other than that Locke’s Two Treatises was “a crucial text for early
Americans.” Hamburger, supra note 117, at 98 n.44.
479 Scalia, supra note 2, at 861.
475
476
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478
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branches to weaken the national legislature in order protect the
powers of the executive and judicial branches. He therefore
advocated this sharing of some legislative power with members of
the other branches so that, acting in concert, they could defend
their branches from encroachment by Congress. Madison would
have given the Council of Revision, made up mostly of judges,
great ability to set the nation’s policy through its revisionary
power.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, feared that creating a
robust nondelegation doctrine would allow the Supreme Court to
usurp legislative powers from Congress. Justice Scalia expressed
fear that an invigorated nondelegation doctrine would allow the
Court to seize too much control of policy decisions, decisions that
should be made by Congress as a representative assembly and
not by, as Justice Scalia put it, “a hermetically sealed committee
of nine lawyers.”480 He recognized that the nondelegation
doctrine is self-contradictory, in that the Court would be seizing
legislative power in order to prevent Congress from exercising its
own discretion and decide whether, when, and how much of its
legislative power to delegate to federal agencies.481 The Supreme
Court, by creating an activist nondelegation doctrine, would
make itself Congress’s master by creating a rule that Congress is
powerless to change.
Embracing a robust nondelegation doctrine would make
the Court completely unconstrained, as it would be applying a
self-fashioned
doctrine
completely
absent
from
the
Constitution, virtually absent at the Founding, and contrary to
the practice of the First Congress. The Court would be seizing
the power to determine such basic policy as the reach and
function of the administrative state and the effectiveness of
regulation of the environment, health care, financial services,
and countless other policies that should be determined by the
people’s representatives in Congress, not by judges with the
“fortitude” to seize power.
Under the guise of preventing the “tyranny” of delegation, the
Court would be creating a government by judiciary, making The
Court’s Justices tyrants, the unassailable masters of the
government, who in finding any messy evidence of some power in
the tangled history of the Founding can construct rules not in the

Id.
See Scalia, supra note 354, at 28 (“[T]o a large extent judicial invocation of the
unconstitutional delegation doctrine is a self-denying ordinance–forbidding the transfer of
legislative power not to the agencies, but to the courts themselves.”).
480
481
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Constitution’s text to overrule Congress and the President on even
the most important issues about the nation’s policy and structure.
Locke was concerned that Parliament as representative of the
public would cede too much power to the unelected and virtually
unremovable King. How ironic that an originalist Supreme Court
might use Locke’s words to strip legislative power from Congress
and grant itself a non-constitutional, ill-defined, and unconstrained
power to veto the nation’s laws, no matter how longstanding, a
terrifying power to be held by an unelected and virtually
unremovable Court.
The Court may well not to take this step. The Justices might
review the extensive evidence of delegation and the lack of
evidence of a nondelegation doctrine at the Founding and
conclude that neither the original intent of the framers or
ratifiers nor the original meaning of the Constitution justifies
such a far-reaching seizure of power over Congress by the Court,
overturning centuries of precedent despite such grave doubt. The
Court could reject the arguments of some originalists and go back
to the original concepts that first animated originalism, that the
Court should exercise judicial restraint and in doing so protect
Congress’s legislative powers. Only time will tell.

